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Abstract 
After a period of convergence where many perceived the country as a success case, 
Portuguese economic performance proved to be disappointing in the last decade. 
Although the literature on the causes of Portugal’s performance has been proliferating 
in recent years, most contributions do not focus on structural issues, that is, on changes 
in the composition and technological content of the Portuguese economy. Hence, we 
aim to fill this gap in this thesis adopting a structuralist approach. 
We start with an extensive literature review which relates structural and technological 
change, economic growth and convergence, addressing both theoretical and empirical 
work, with a special attention on studies focusing on the Portuguese case. In the second 
part, we implement an empirical study aiming at analysing the role played by 
technology and efficiency change in the process of the Portuguese catching-up with 
more developed economies. 
The empirical analysis relies on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a methodology 
which, to our knowledge, has not yet been used in the analysis of the growth process of 
the Portuguese economy. This method consists in building a technological frontier, 
measuring then the distances between each country and the frontier. This approach 
allows us to address the impact of technology and efficiency change along the last 
decades, comparing the Portuguese case with other countries.  
The results show a divergent pattern of the Portuguese economy relative to the 
technological frontier and a deterioration of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), measured 
by a Malmquist index, since 1980. When human capital and Research and Development 
(R&D) expenditures are included along with physical capital and labour, the results 
show an improvement, which seems to indicate the relative greater efficiency in the use 
of these factors.  
Despite the important progress in the fields of education and innovation that occurred in 
Portugal in the last decades there is still much to be done, since the country remains far 
from the technological frontier. 
Keywords: Economic growth, catching-up, technology, structural change, innovation. 
JEL-codes: O3, O47, L16 
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Resumo 
Após um período de convergência, onde muitos apontaram o país como um caso de 
sucesso, o desempenho económico Português na última década provou ser 
decepcionante. Embora a literatura sobre as causas desse mau desempenho tenha vindo 
a proliferar nos últimos anos, a maioria dessas contribuições não se concentra nas 
questões estruturais ligadas às mudanças na composição e conteúdo tecnológico da 
economia Portuguesa. Assim, com esta tese pretendemos preencher essa lacuna 
adotando uma abordagem estruturalista. 
Começamos com uma extensa revisão da literatura que relaciona a mudança estrutural e 
tecnológica com o crescimento económico e a convergência, abordando tanto o trabalho 
teórico como o empírico, com uma atenção especial nos estudos sobre o caso Português. 
Numa segunda parte, apresentamos e desenvolvemos um estudo empírico com o 
objetivo de analisar o papel desempenhado pela mudança tecnológica e pela eficiência 
no processo de convergência de Portugal com as economias mais desenvolvidas. 
A análise empírica baseia-se numa metodologia chamada Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) que, no nosso conhecimento, ainda não foi utilizada na análise do processo de 
crescimento da economia Portuguesa. Este método consiste na construção de uma 
fronteira tecnológica calculando depois a distância entre cada país e a fronteira. Esta 
abordagem permite-nos analisar comparativamente não só o impacto da mudança 
tecnológica como da eficiência ao longo das últimas décadas na economia Portuguesa. 
Os resultados mostram uma tendência divergente da economia Português em relação à 
fronteira tecnológica e uma deterioração da Produtividade Total dos Fatores (TFP), 
medida por um índice de Malmquist, desde 1980. Quando incluímos na análise o capital 
humano e as despesas em Investigação e Develpment (R&D), juntamente com o capital 
físico e o trabalho, os resultados mostram uma melhoria, o que parece indicar uma 
eficiência relativamente maior no uso desses fatores. 
Ainda assim, apesar dos progressos importantes nos campos da educação e da inovação 
registados em Portugal nas últimas décadas, há ainda muito a ser feito uma vez que o 
país continua muito longe da fronteira tecnológica. 
Palavras-chave: Crescimento económico, convergência, tecnologia, mudança 
estrutural, inovação. 
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Chapter 1 –Introduction 
 
Until the 19th century, the differences in income and productivity per head between the 
richest and the poorest countries were very small. According to Maddison’s data 
(Maddison, 2008) in the 19th century the welfare of an inhabitant on an average country 
was about one half of the corresponding level registered by a leader nation. The 
Industrial Revolution, marking the beginning of modern economic growth and the 
departure from the Malthusian dynamics, altered this situation. The high pace of 
technological change and the improvements in working methods, asymmetrically 
distributed in the geographical space, created important differences between countries. 
Consequently, when we nowadays compare the welfare level in an average country with 
that observed in a technology leader, the proportion is about one to six (Maddison, 
2008).  
Figure 1 shows trends in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head in a number of 
nations between 1500 and 2008. From its inspection it becomes clear the growth 
explosion that some European nations registered after 1800. 
Figure 1: GDP per head 1500-2008 (PPP 1990 USD) 
 
Source: Maddison Historical Statistics (http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm, accessed on 13-
01-2013). 
Early comers of the Industrial Revolution experienced a very strong increase in 
productivity levels. Before this major transformation, 50.000 hours were necessary to 
produce 100 pounds of cotton yarn nº 80. With the introduction of a new technology 
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called “Robert’s machine”, the same amount of cotton yarn took only 135 hours to 
produce, i.e., the productivity was multiplied by a factor of 370 (Bairoch, 1974)! 
The countries at the forefront began therefore to distance themselves from those that did 
not adopt the new technologies. Countries such as the Netherlands, for example, were 
able to reduce the gap and catch-up with the pioneer (England), whereas others, most 
notably, Southern European countries, did not have such capability and lagged behind 
(e.g. Allen, 2003). 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Portuguese GDP was on pair with the rest of 
Europe, except for England, due to the prominent role that Portugal had in the period of 
European commercial capitalism (XV to XVIII century). During the Industrial 
Revolution, however, Portugal did not implement the ongoing technological 
transformations, being included within the group of countries who remained aside from 
the major technological breakthrough. Its geographical position and the scarcity of key 
natural resources used in emergent industrial activities seem to constitute important 
explaining factors for the country’s backwardness during this period (Costa et al., 
2011). 
Since innovations resulting from the Industrial Revolution were not extended to 
Portugal in the early stage of the revolution, a significant increase of the technology gap 
relative to leader countries was observed within a short period of time. Between 1830 
and 1913, Portuguese per capita Gross National Product (GNP) decreased from around 
95% of the average GNP per capita of the ten most advanced European countries to less 
than 40% (Bairoch, 1976).
1
 The situation would only be reversed in the second half of 
the twentieth century, when Portugal started a path of convergence to the European 
core, which benefited from a very favourable international environment. The 
intensification of trade flows, along with exchange rate stability granted by the Bretton 
Woods system, strongly contributed to a better performance of the Portuguese economy. 
Still, in the 1950s, the country was mainly a rural economy, with an incipient industrial 
sector, a feature that would only begin to change in the subsequent decades. An export-
oriented industrialization policy, benefiting from European Free Trade Association 
                                               
1
 The ten countries are: Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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(EFTA) membership and the increase of foreign trade, led to rapid structural change, 
with the transition from low productive agriculture to industrial economic activities, 
which possessed higher productivity growth that translated into a strong pace of 
economic growth (Lains, 2003). 
The trend of rapid economic growth would stop in 1973/1974, after the first major “oil 
shock” that coincided with the “Carnation Revolution” that changed the political regime 
(Pinto, 2003). The integration of Portugal into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) in 1986 marks the return to a strong trajectory of convergence. In the subsequent 
decades the country benefited from large amounts of structural funds, intended to 
promote and assist the development and restructuring of the less developed economies. 
It was during this period that the country undergone a more pronounced structural 
change, with a strong fall of the primary sector and an increase in the share of services. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the effects of trade creation resulting from the 
EEC membership also gave rise to changes in export intensity and structure (Amaral, 
2010). Beyond these aspects, it is important to highlight the institutional changes 
resulting from the EEC membership, particularly in terms of competition and justice, 
which created a better environment for growth (Amaral, 2010). 
The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 established the Cohesion Fund to further strengthen the 
support to countries with lower income. The so-called Cohesion Group included 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland. In Table 1 we can observe the performance of 
these four countries since 1913 up to 2009. 
Table 1: Growth rate of real income per capita of Cohesion Countries 
 
Portugal Spain Ireland Greece 
European 
core
2
 
1913-1929 1,35 1,65 0,33 2,45 1,39 
1929-1938 1,28 -3,53 0,87 1,50 1,16 
1938-1950 1,56 1,48 0,94 -2,72 1,00 
1950-1973 5,47 5,63 2,98 5,99 3,55 
1973-1986 1,52 1,31 2,47 1,75 2,01 
1986-1998 3,45 2,65 5,42 1,39 1,88 
1998-2009 1,00 2,80 3,50 3,30 1,31 
Source: adapted from Costa et al. (2011). 
                                               
2
 The countries considered in the core are: Germany (only the Western part till 1991), Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden. 
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Portugal’s performance after entering in the EEC was largely positive, which led to the 
country being dubbed a “success case” within Europe (Pereira and Lains, 2012). 
Between 1980 and 2000, Portugal reduced in 19 percentage points the difference over 
the average per capita GDP in the EU (Aiginger, 2003). 
However, after a period of convergence where many perceived the country as a success 
case (Pereira and Lains, 2012), in the last decade Portuguese economic performance 
proved to be disappointing. In fact, in 2010, the country was six percent poorer than at 
the beginning of the decade (Amaral, 2010). 
As revealed by several studies from economic historians (e.g., Allen), the current 
worldwide differences in economic growth and development have to be seen in the 
broader historical context of modern Europe. Their underlying causes are the structural 
and technology changes that took place since Industrial Revolution (see, for example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Since then, the world economy registered important 
technological changes with significant impact on countries’ relative positions. 
Convergence periods have alternated with periods of divergence over time, but the 
available evidence seems to indicate the persistence of striking differences across 
countries, due both to the effects of globalization and of the emergence of radically new 
technologies (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002).  
Within this context, it is our aim to analyse the relationship between technology and 
economic catching-up, focusing on the Portuguese case. More specifically, we intend to 
answer to two major questions:  
(i) Has the technological structure of the Portuguese economy been an obstacle 
for catching up 
(ii) Or will be the inefficient utilization of the available resources largely 
responsible for the results?” 
To this purpose, we use a non parametric methodology for the estimation of a 
production frontier known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Most studies 
approaching the causes of poor performance of the Portuguese economy in the last 
decade were based on the use of parametric methods (e.g., growth accounting and 
econometric regressions), or on the analysis of descriptive statistics (e.g., Mateus, 
2013). In this context, the DEA approach allows us to explore novel features of the 
Portuguese economic growth revisited: a technology-gap explanation 
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Portuguese growth path, addressing not only the impact of technological change, but 
also the efficiency of the Portuguese economy along the last decades. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on the 
interrelatedness features of innovation, technological and structural change and 
economic growth, highlighting the most relevant theoretical studies, along with the 
latest empirical evidence on the subject. An analysis of previous evidence regarding the 
Portuguese case is also undertaken. Chapter 3 presents the empirical work, describing 
the methodology used, the data and assumptions made and presenting the results. 
Chapter 4 concludes, providing a discussion of the main findings, relating to previous 
evidence on the matter and offering some guidelines for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Structural Change, Technology and Economic Growth: a 
review of the literature 
 
“Economic historians, technologists, and advocates of the “new” growth theory all 
emphasise the importance of technology for understanding growth, development and 
convergence.” 
(Bernard and Jones, 1996, p. 1038) 
   
 2.1 Convergence and catching-up 
Although some authors differentiate between convergence and catching-up,3 the two 
concepts are closely related. In the present study they are treated alike, representing a 
trend towards the reduction in income and productivity differences between the most 
advanced countries and the followers. 
Convergence has been an important topic in the economic literature since its very 
inception. However, positions on this topic are not unanimous. On the one hand, some 
authors, like Kaldor (1957), argue that there is a natural tendency for divergence: both 
the interdependence of growth determinants (investment, innovation and population 
growth) and the emergence of processes of cumulative causation would tend to 
aggravate or perpetuate the differences between the economies. 
In contrast, convergence emerges as a natural consequence of growth processes in some 
studies developed within the neoclassical tradition. The Solow model, in particular 
(Solow 1956, 1957), sustains the long run convergence between economies, based on 
the assumption of diminishing returns of capital, and on the controversial conception of 
(exogenous) knowledge as a public good.
4
 There are, however, different views within 
this approach. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), for instance, go beyond the 
convergence mechanism initially outlined by Solow, proposing the inclusion of other 
factors for the explanation of convergence processes, such as school enrolment rates, 
the ratio of government consumption on GDP, life expectancy, fertility rates, and 
                                               
3
 According to Fagerberg and Godinho (2004), “catching-up” relates to the ability of a single country to 
narrow the gap in productivity and income vis-à-vis the leader, whereas “convergence” is more related to 
a trend towards a reduction of the overall differences in productivity and income in the world economy. 
4
 The concept of beta convergence, according to which the poor economies tend to grow faster than the 
rich ones, stems directly from this assumption. 
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standard macroeconomic variables, as the inflation rate. The theoretical arguments 
behind Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s work are based on the concept of conditional 
convergence. Long run (steady state) output per head would depend not only on the 
savings rate and the population growth rate, as in Solow (1956), but also on variables 
reflecting government policies, such as taxes, market distortions, quality of institutions 
(law and property rights), exchange rates, political freedom, and human capital 
accumulation. Hence, different countries, with different starting points, might converge 
to different steady states. In this context, convergence is seen in conditional terms, 
taking place if the country further away from its specific steady state grows faster. 
Despite the importance of the aforementioned contributions, the analysis of 
convergence across countries is typically based on a simpler concept of catching-up, 
known as sigma convergence. This type of convergence takes place if the dispersion of 
productivity levels diminishes overtime (Sala-i-Martin, 1996).
5
 This measure captures 
rather well the world evidence, featured by a situation where some countries catch-up 
(and, in some cases, forge ahead), while others fall behind (Abramovitz, 1986).  
The ability to reduce the gap to the world leader is commonly explained by some 
studies based on a neo-Schumpeterian perspective on the followers’ capability to imitate 
and appropriate innovations developed by leaders (Fagerberg, 1987). The pace at which 
catching-up occurs depends furthermore on the pace of structural change, the rates of 
investment and the expansion of demand, among other factors. This point is stressed by 
Abramovitz (1994), who sees one of the greatest periods of international convergence - 
the post-war catch-up and convergence boom - as the result of two essential factors: 
technological congruence and social capability. The former relates to the congruence 
between market size, production factors and market supply. According to the author, 
these factors were present in the rapid American catching-up at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. By that time, the U.S. already had a large and homogenous market, 
benefiting also from abundant skilled labour. Abramovitz (1994) also associates the 
boom occurred in Europe in the post-war period with the launching of a single market 
and with the subsequent increase in the mobility of productive factors.  
                                               
5
 Sala-i-Martin (1996) distinguishes between the concepts of sigma and beta convergence, although they 
are closely related. The choice of a specific concept of catching up is made dependent upon the specific 
focus of the analysis. 
Portuguese economic growth revisited: a technology-gap explanation 
 8 
The second factor, social capability, encompasses the various efforts made to improve 
infrastructure and workforce skills, along with R&D. It is the interrelatedness of these 
two major forces that constitutes the key to successful catching-up, an understanding 
which is in line with some economic historians’ findings (e.g., Gerchenkron, 1962), 
according to which processes of convergence do not take place automatically, requiring 
instead a number of economic and social conditions. 
Another important contribution within the catching up literature builds around the 
concept of convergence clubs. This concept has its roots in   Baumol’s famous 1986 
paper, in which an analysis of growth and convergence paths in the long run is 
undertaken, and an identification of several convergence clubs is made.  Since countries 
have different capabilities to innovate and take advantage of spillovers from the more 
advanced ones, a tendency for polarization is observed, with technology being a key 
variable in this context (Castellaci, 2008).
6
 
In order to better understand the dynamics and links between these processes, the next 
section presents an overview on the technology dimension of broad processes of 
structural change. 
 
 
 2.2. Technology, structural change and economic growth: main concepts 
and analytical frames 
 
“Technology is a main source of economic development and a major factor to explain 
growth differences across countries.” 
(Castellaci, 2008) 
 
Technological change may be seen as a specific dimension of the broad concept of 
“structural change”, taken as different arrangements of productive activity in the 
economy. As noted by Silva and Teixeira (2008) in their comprehensive survey on the 
issue, structural change analysis has an important tradition in economic theory, with 
discussions about the issue being present in the economic discourse since the Classics.  
                                               
6
 See, for example, Durlauf and Johson (1995), for a more detailed analysis on this matter. 
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An important contribution on the matter stems from the work of Joseph Schumpeter, 
who provides a compelling explanation on the relationship between technology, 
structural change and economic growth. According to this author, economic 
development is an intrinsically dynamic process, with innovation as the driving force of 
change: innovation changes market conditions and competition, as well as the allocation 
of resources among different sectors. These changes, in turn, are part of a dynamic 
process, where new products and new businesses replace those that become obsolete.  
In the two fundamental books of Schumpeter, Business Cycles (1939), and Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1942), the mechanisms of growth and structural change are 
analysed in depth and the well known notion of “creative destruction” emerges at the 
core of the development processes, as displayed in Figure 2. Firms within the 
established sectors start to innovate as a response to the new challenges in order to adapt 
to market changes and there is a sequence between creative reaction and creative 
destruction. These concepts are also highlighted in more recent contributions to the 
theory of innovation and structural change (e.g. Quatrato, 2009; Castellacci, 2008).
7
 
Figure 2: Feedback among innovation, structural change and economic growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Source: Adapted from Quatrato (2009). 
In Schumpeter’s work, the expectation of higher profits is what drives investment in 
innovation, which in turn generates productivity growth. Growth rates are not equal 
across sectors, with sectors more directly related to technology change assuming 
leadership. Leading sectors tend to play a key role as drivers of the change process, 
                                               
7
 Fagerberg (2003) presents a comprehensive analysis of Schumpeter’s contribution to economics and an 
overview of the more recent literature based in his legacy. 
Innovation 
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whereas firms that are not at the forefront of innovation tend to react to changes through 
adaptation.
 8
 
Another seminal contribution relating structural transformations and growth is from the 
1971 Economics Nobel Prize, Simon Kuznets. Adopting a different framework 
(Kuznets strongly criticized Schumpeter’s view on long waves in a 1940 paper), the 
author identifies a number of common characteristics to growth processes, such as high 
growth rates in population, per capita income and factor productivity, along with very 
rapid paces of structural transformation. Major aspects of structural change within 
Kuznets work (cf. Kuznets, 1966) include the shift away of resources from agriculture 
towards manufacturing, the increase in the scale of productive units, along with changes 
in organization, status of labour, and in the structure of consumption. Kuznets makes 
clear that “[a]dvancing technology is the permissive source of economic growth, but it 
is only a potential, a necessary condition, in itself not sufficient” (1973, p. 247, 
emphasis added). In order to achieve growth, profound institutional change would also 
be required.  
Although these two major contributions on growth and structural change were mainly 
developed within a non-formal approach, an increasing number of studies have been 
performed in a mathematized way. Seminal studies using such an approach are, for 
example, those developed by Pasinetti (1981) and Baumol (1967). 
Pasinetti (1981) develops a model which establishes links between structural change 
and economic growth, based on a combination of post-Keynesian and Classical 
contributions with Engel’s law.9 Since economic growth implies necessarily the growth 
of income, as income increases, consumption choices tend to shift from one group of 
goods and services to another. At the same time, technology has an uneven impact on 
sectors, changing their relative importance over time. Thus, technology and demand 
changes are the main causes of structural change (Pasinetti, 1981). 
                                               
8
 The question about the causal link between structural change and growth has no unequivocal answer. In 
a recent study, Dietrich (2012) examines this question through the analysis of seven OECD countries 
between 1960 and 2004, pointing out effects in both directions. 
9
 According to Engel’s law, as income increases, the proportion spent on food declines and the proportion 
of spending on services and manufactures increases, due to the greater elasticity of demand for industrial 
goods and services. 
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Baumol (1967) also addresses the uneven impact of technology changes across sectors, 
but from a different perspective, based on a supply-side logic. In his unbalanced growth 
model, structural change tends to have a negative effect on aggregate growth, since the 
technologically stagnant sector, benefiting only from “sporadic increases in 
productivity” (Baumol, 1967, p. 416) tends to increase its relevance relative to the 
technologically progressive one. The former comprises services, whereas the latter 
typically includes manufacturing activities. Although the two sectors have different 
productivity growth rates, both tend to have the same wage growth rates, and therefore 
unit costs and prices rise faster in the technology stagnant sector. It is the similar rise of 
wages that triggers the well-known “cost disease” effect (Hartwig, 2012). Taking into 
account that the demand of services is highly price-elastic, consumers are willing to pay 
higher prices, and hence the (employment) weight of the stagnant sector tends to 
increase. In these terms, the model predicts that the output of mature economies, where 
the share of services is high, tends to stagnate over time (Hartwig, 2012). Some years 
after the original study, Baumol et al. (1985) revisit the unbalanced growth theory and 
note that the analysis may be not linear because there are different productivity levels 
within the services sector.  
Baumol’s conclusions have been recently corroborated by Ngai and Pissarides (2007). 
In their multisector model of growth, the authors show that different TFP growth rates 
across industrial sectors lead to sectorial employment changes. The key requirement for 
that relies on the low elasticity of substitution between final goods (Ngai and Pissarides, 
2007). 
In a recent study which assesses the relative importance of demand vs. supply-side 
effects on structural change in the U.S. economy during the two last centuries, Dennis 
and Iscan (2009) decompose changes in structure into three components: one centred on 
Engel’s law and on demand behaviour, the others referring to supply-side effects, one 
due to distinct sectorial productivity growth rates (Baumol effect), and the other 
associated with differential rates of capital deepening. Their main conclusion is that 
demand effects dominate until the 1950s, but that a reversion occurs afterwards, with 
Baumol’s effect achieving dominance (Dennis and Iscan, 2009). 
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The inter-relatedness between technology, structural change and economic growth has 
also been the focus of a number of studies developed within broad neo-schumpeterian 
and evolutionary streams of research. An important centre of research is the Science 
Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex where notable researchers 
have been affiliated (e.g., Giovanni Dosi, Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez). 
Based on the similarities between science and technology, and considering the 
dichotomy “continuity/discontinuity” of technological change, Dosi (1982, p. 158) 
argues that “radical” vs. “incremental” innovations can be reinterpreted in terms of 
normal technical progress, as opposed to new emerging technological paradigms. 
Within this framework, the author is able to distinguish between changes along a 
technological paradigm from changes in the paradigm itself. New technological 
paradigms emerge and are selected among the set of possible options, taking into 
account the interplay between scientific advances, economic conditions and institutional 
variables, providing a more comprehensive account of the factors behind technological 
change than pure “demand-pull” or “technology-push” theories.10 
In a related account, Perez (1983, 1985) follows the Schumpeterian research line on 
economic cycles (the so-called long wave literature), relating these cycles with 
structural change and technological trajectories. Perez introduces the concept of techno-
economic paradigm, which consists in new combinations of innovations at the level of 
product, process and organization, with the potential to generate an increase in 
productivity in almost all sectors of the economy, thus creating new investment 
opportunities. The change from one paradigm to another lies not only on the 
opportunity to economically explore a cluster of radical innovations, as in Dosi’s work, 
but it is also crucially dependent on the emergence of a “key input” associated to each 
paradigm. The “key input” should satisfy certain conditions, being available in (almost) 
unlimited terms, benefiting from low and marginally decreasing costs, and being 
potentially applicable to various products and production processes (Freeman and Perez, 
1988). According to this line of research, major technological breakthroughs have a 
strong impact which goes beyond the strict economic sphere, affecting the whole socio-
institutional background. 
                                               
10
 About the dichotomy “demand-pull” vs. “technology-push” see, e.g., Di Stefano et al. (2012). 
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In line with this assertion, Freeman and Louçã (2001) provide a detailed analysis of 
economic and social changes that have occurred since the end of the eighteenth century 
until the end of the twentieth century. Along this period, the authors identify the 
existence of five different paradigms associated with five Kondratiev waves, the first 
coinciding with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, starting in England, and the 
last corresponding to the spread of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT). A contrasting view is, however, taken by Verspagen (2004), which analyses the 
role of ICT in the process of structural change in the U.S. economy that occurred in the 
postwar period,
11
 concluding that there is not evidence yet of a new revolution based on 
ICT, but rather a complementarity role of ICT within the paradigm of mass production. 
These conclusions are in line with those from Quah (1997), who questions the role of 
ICT on economic growth.
12
  
Along with its central role in the explanation of the patterns of development of 
economies over time, technological progress has also been at the core of discussions 
about growth trajectories and the dynamics of convergence and divergence across 
countries. A line of research that has taken prominence in the study of these trajectories 
is the technology gap literature, started with the seminal contribution from Fagerberg 
(1987). In this work, Fagerberg proposes a technology gap growth model, which is 
tested in a sample of 25 countries, for the period between 1960 and 1983, considering 
four major hypotheses: 
H1: There is a close relation between a country’s economic and technological levels of 
development; 
H2: The rate of economic growth of a country is positively influenced by the rate of 
growth in the technological level of the country; 
H3: It is possible for a country facing a technological gap, i.e. a country on a lower 
technological level than the countries on “the world innovation frontier”, to increase its 
rate of economic growth through imitation or “catching-up”; 
H4: The rate at which a country exploits the possibilities offered by the technological 
gap depends on its ability to mobilize resources for transforming social, institutional and 
economic structures. 
                                               
11
 He analyses the period 1958-1998. 
12
 It is important to bear in mind, however, that this result may reflect the time period chosen for 
analyzing the impact of ICT (1972-1992). 
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The results found by Fagerberg show that innovation tends to increase the differences 
(or the technological gap) relative to the countries in the technological frontier: when a 
country innovates, ceteris paribus, it distances itself from the others, increasing the 
technological gap to followers. Imitation, on the other hand, tends to reduce the 
differences or the technological gap between countries, being mainly carried out by 
followers. Therefore, innovation contributes to divergence in development levels 
between countries, whereas diffusion leads to the opposite trend.  
More recently, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) re-estimate Fagerberg’s model, 
introducing some refinements relatively to the original test. More precisely, an 
expansion of the period under analysis up to 1995 is undertaken, along with the 
inclusion of time-slope and continental dummies to check for changes in the evolution 
of the variables over time and for the potential impact of spatial correlations (Fagerberg 
and Verspagen, 2002). They find that the role of imitation has become significantly 
weaker in more recent times, whereas innovation increased its importance both in 
economic growth and convergence. In fact, the authors emphasize that, in order to 
successfully catch up, imitation is not enough; the countries must also innovate, which 
makes the catching up process nowadays technologically more demanding than in the 
past. In their model, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) also measure the impact of a 
number of specific sectors in the catching up paths of the observed countries, 
concluding that the composition of economic activity matters. 
Similar evidence is found in a recent study from Caldas et al. (2009). The authors 
develop a model in order to better understand the relationship between the factors 
underlying the dynamics of convergence and divergence over time. To this purpose, 
they consider technological capability as the main variable responsible for boosting 
productivity changes. The processes of production of local knowledge and its 
diffusion/absorption are seen as privileged sources of technological capability, in line 
with Fagerberg’s model (1987). The results show that to achieve full convergence three 
conditions must be satisfied: (i) mutual learning cannot be influenced by differences in 
the levels of technological change; (ii) spatial distance should not harm interactions, so 
that they are likely to exist, even between distant regions, (iii) the process of 
technological development is not characterized by increasing returns. The authors also 
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argue that a successful trajectory of convergence requires a broad and systemic policy 
vision, finding important polarization effects in this process. 
Also within the technology-gap literature, Castellacci (2008) develops a model which 
combines differences in technology across countries with the aforementioned concept of 
convergence clubs (Baumol, 1986) to explain the dynamics between technological 
diffusion and convergence. The analysis is based on five core propositions (Castellacci, 
2008, p. 303): 
1) The technology gap provides opportunities for catching up through the imitation of 
foreign advanced technologies. 
2) The ability to exploit these opportunities depends on the absorptive capacity of a 
country. Countries will only catch up if their absorptive capacity is above a 
minimum threshold level. 
3) The absorptive capacity is greatly affected by the level of human capital. The latter 
does not simply have a direct effect on growth (as a production factor) but also an 
indirect effect by enabling imitation and technological catching up.  
4) The innovative ability of a country is the other major growth factor.  
5) Different levels of absorptive capacity and innovative ability determine in which 
club each national economy belongs to in any given period, determining therefore 
whether a country will be able to catch up with the technological frontier or fall 
behind. 
The main results point to the existence of three technology clubs that differ both in the 
technological level and in their trajectories of change and growth over time. The study 
clearly highlights the importance of significant levels of human capital, technological 
infrastructure and strong capacity to generate new knowledge
13
 as main determinants to 
belong to the club of advanced countries (Castellacci, 2008). 
A more recent paper from the same author (Castellacci, 2011) reinforces the importance 
of these factors. The author distinguishes between the role played by human capital and 
technological infrastructure, factors which are crucial in terms of capability of catching 
up, from the role played by innovation, which affects significantly divergence paths. 
The growing importance of human capital is also emphasized, particularly the 
                                               
13
 The innovative ability is proxied by patents and the number of scientific articles. 
Portuguese economic growth revisited: a technology-gap explanation 
 16 
attendance of tertiary education, when a country gets closer to the technological 
frontier. According to Castellacci, the biggest challenge for a country in a catching-up 
process is to reconcile the construction of “traditional” infrastructures, which were 
important to its development, with the necessary technological and structural adaptation 
in order to maximize the benefits stemming from the absorption of knowledge from 
abroad (Castellacci, 2011). 
Once again, strong emphasis is put in the need for a combination of integrated policies 
for a successful convergence process, a conclusion which is also supported by Los and 
Verspagen (2006). In this latter work, a dynamic model of growth and trade is 
developed, which attempts to measure the impact of innovation, international 
knowledge spillovers and learning-by-doing on sectorial productivity growth and on 
countries’ specialization patterns. Countries’ productivity records and specialization are 
the result of the relations between the three factors described above, i.e., innovation, 
spillovers and learning-by-doing. In line with fundamental conclusions of endogenous 
growth models (e.g., Romer, 1986, 1990), in this study R&D and technological 
spillovers constitute two major forces influencing growth. The other major force - 
learning-by-doing- reflects the cumulative impact of learning, which may be a source of 
divergence, since it may perpetuate the status quo of each economy. The model results 
show a very complex dynamics between innovation, spillovers and learning-by-doing. 
The tendency for convergence, is like a “drop in the ocean”, since its occurrence, 
though possible, is far from being automatic (Los and Verspagen, 2006). Other 
significant conclusions drawn from this model include the potential role played by trade 
in the widening of technology gaps between the countries involved, and the need for a 
complex combination of several factors for a successful catching-up, as indicated by 
Abramovitz (1994). 
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 2.3. Recent empirical evidence on technology, structural change and 
economic growth 
Throughout the previous sections, a broad literature review was presented on the topics 
of structural and technological change, as well as on their impacts on economic growth 
and convergence. Prominence was given to seminal works in these areas. Although 
some of the above studies also assumed an empirical orientation, we now focus on 
recent empirical contributions that explore the inter-relatedness between these 
processes. 
In recent years, the central role of technological change explaining convergence and 
divergence patterns has been deeply discussed, giving rise to a number of empirical 
works attempting to analyse these processes. In this section we present some of the most 
relevant empirical work on structural and technological change, starting with more 
“traditional” approaches (shift-share and regression analysis), and focusing afterwards 
on studies based on the estimation of technological frontiers. Throughout this survey, 
special attention is given to the Portuguese case, which constitutes the focus of our 
research. 
 2.3.1. Studies based on shift-share and econometric techniques 
Shift-share analysis is an important tool in the analysis of the role played by structural 
change on growth. This accounting approach consists in the decomposition of the 
changes of the aggregate (productivity) into three structural components. Two related to 
changes in the composition of the economy, namely: “static shift effect” (the 
contribution to productivity growth from changes in the allocation of labour between 
industries) and the “dynamic shift effect” (the interaction between changes in 
productivity in individual industries and changes in the allocation of labour across 
industries); and one related to productivity  growth within individual industries, the 
“within shift effect” (weighted by the share of these industries in total employment). 
This technique has been applied by Fagerberg (2000), in his analysis of the relationship 
between the economic structure of a country and its productivity growth in a sample 
composed by 39 countries and 24 industries between 1973 and 1990. The results show 
that the most important effect is the intra-sectoral one, thus neglecting the impact of 
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structural change. However, this contradicts the results obtained by Salter (1960). 
Measuring changes of productivity in the UK in the first half of the 20th century, Salter 
(1960, p. 9) argues that “a flexible structure of production is an important element in the 
high rate of productivity increase, for it allows an economy to rapidly redistribute its 
resources so as to take maximum advantage of changing patterns of technological 
progress”. For this author, a country specialized in technologically progressive 
industries enjoys high rates of growth compared to other countries that do not make a 
similar choice. In his study, the first two components analysed by Fagerberg (2000) 
have much more impact.  
In order to sustain the main result mentioned above, Fagerberg (2000) argues that there 
is nowadays a weaker correlation between output growth, productivity and employment 
comparing with what happened in the past. The author notes that technological change 
and the sectors with faster productivity growth in the period studied by Salter tend to 
generate much more employment than in his sample period. However, Fagerberg still 
defends a role for the structural change in economic growth paths. He observes, for 
instance, that in the period under analysis, the electrical machinery industry has 
experienced higher productivity growth than any other industry, implying a significant 
growth bonus for countries with higher shares of this industry (Fagerberg, 2000). 
Fagerberg also claims that this industry generates important spillover effects to the 
economy, which are stronger at the local or national level.
14
 
In the same line of research, Peneder (2003) also presents empirical evidence on the 
impact of industrial structure on aggregate income and growth. Using two different 
methodologies, namely, shift share analysis and panel data regression, he seeks for 
empirical validation for different sources of impact of structural change. Shift-share 
results are similar to Fagerberg’s (2000), i.e., the intra-sectoral effect is clearly 
dominant, whereas the impact of labour reallocation between industries over aggregate 
growth is very weak. Peneder explains that this result is frequent with this kind of 
methodology.
15
 
                                               
14
 Carree (2003) points out some methodological errors in Fagerberg’s analysis and suggests a new 
method for estimating the impact of the so-called “electronics revolution”.  
15
 The author notes that the “within effect” is almost a sum of contributions with positive sign. However, 
both shift effects depend on the variation of the labour shares, accordingly, the sum over all industries has 
positive and negative contributions implying that the final, net result will tend to be lower. 
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Nevertheless, looking at the signs of the components, it is still possible to find evidence 
in favour of a structural bonus/burden over time. The strongest evidence refers to the 
impact of the service sector on productivity growth, due to the increasing share of the 
sector in both employment and value added (Peneder, 2003). Despite the positive 
contribution of services, the evidence of a structural burden, as advocated by Baumol 
(1967), is still present. The reallocation of labour away from industries with high 
productivity growth as consequence of tertiarization is a fact that cannot be denied. 
In order to overcome some of the methodological problems of the technique and present 
a more complete study of the effects of structural change over growth, Peneder (2003) 
also performs an econometric test using panel data. This approach allows not only for 
the detection of directly measurable effects, but takes also into consideration the indirect 
effects stemming from spillovers between different activities. The results show that the 
relative share of exports of technology driven and skill intensive industries has a 
significant and positive impact on income growth. This effect is explained by the ability 
of certain industries to create new markets and new products that will induce new needs 
in consumers, and by the positive producer related spillovers among industries 
(Peneder, 2003). Imports also have an important role, although their impact is more 
modest. In short, when the price mechanism is not able to fully capture the value of 
knowledge, positive externalities between industries gain a more significant importance, 
being trade a privileged mean for spreading it. 
Several studies have emerged in recent years exploring these links between international 
trade, structural change and economic growth. This is indeed, one of the research lines 
that registered higher growth, as indicated in Silva and Teixeira (2008). 
Amable (2000) approaches this subject, using a panel composed by 39 countries (the 
OECD countries and some developing Asian and Latin America countries), from 1965 
to 1990. The author includes, in his regression, three indicators of trade as explanatory 
variables, namely: an index of inter-industry specialization, an index of trade 
dissimilarity, and an indicator of comparative advantage in electronics. The first two 
variables reflect the structure of exports and imports of a country, using detailed 
industry level data. The third variable is based on the comparison of the trade surplus in 
electronics with aggregate trade surplus. 
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The results show that international specialization has a significant impact on economic 
growth. The higher the specialization at the inter-industry level, the higher the growth 
bonus. However, the relationship between trade and growth is not always positive and 
specialization may be adverse, causing stagnation rather than growth. When a country 
specializes in industries with strong international demand the effect tends to be positive 
(the country tends to grow faster, benefiting from trade), but when the specialization 
occurs in industries with weak international demand and low growth potential, it will 
have adverse effects, limiting growth prospects. An adverse process of cumulative 
causation may be in place, which constitutes a matter of deep concern (Amable, 2000). 
Although this does not constitute an anti-trade argument, it emphasizes that there may 
be winners and losers in trade, depending on the particular specialization of the 
country.
16
  
Amable also refers to the specific role played by ICT industries, the fastest growing 
categories in international trade during the 1980s. The evidence presented reveals that 
countries specialized in the electronics industry benefited from greater productivity 
increases and, hence, higher growth. The author also notes that higher levels of 
education reinforce the positive effects of the specialization in electronics. 
In the same line of research, but using a different methodology,
17
 Laursen (2000) 
analyses the trends of specialization, both in terms of trade (exports) and in 
technological terms. Based on a sample of 19 OECD countries between 1971 and 1991, 
the author concludes that both exports and technological specialization are path-
dependent, i.e., their evolution depends on past events. This fact helps to explain the 
relative stability observed in the structure of exports and technological specialization, 
although the latter is relatively less pronounced. Laursen (2000) notes that catching-up 
countries show greater variability in the productive structure. It is also shown that, to 
the extent that imitation and knowledge spillovers are important vehicles for growth, 
their impact will be higher if the economic structures of leader and follower countries 
are alike. Catching-up countries should therefore attempt to change their production 
                                               
16
 See also Los and Verspagen (2006), for a similar view. 
17
 Laursen (2000) uses cross-section regressions rather than panel data as used by Amable (2000). 
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structures towards those from more advanced industries.
18
 Although these results are 
not found in all countries analysed by Laursen, they reinforce previous evidence 
showing that structural and technological changes constitute important factors for 
economic growth and catching-up. 
Another recent work which analyses empirically the effects of structural change in the 
economic performance of countries is the 2011 article by Silva and Teixeira. The 
authors analyse the evolution of 10 countries that were very similar with regard to their 
economic structure in the 1970s between 1979 and 2003, using dynamic panel data 
analysis.
19
 In this study, the aim is not so much to analyse the impact of a particular 
sector or determinant in the growth process as, in Fagerberg (2000) and Peneder’s 
(2003) works, but to explore the different trajectories followed by “relatively less 
developed countries” during the 1979-2003  period (Silva and Teixeira, 2011). 
Using explanatory variables such as education, investment in physical capital, indexes 
of structural change and other control variables, the results indicate a positive 
relationship between structural change and economic growth. Changes towards more 
knowledge and technology intensive sectors have favourable results, namely in terms of 
the reduction of the share of low-skill and supplier-dominated industries in favour of 
high-skill and science-based ones. These transformations cause positive effects, 
emerging from the production of higher value added products and services, but also 
from the positive externalities to other sectors of the economy, to the extent that their 
outputs can function as inputs for them. 
Silva and Teixeira’s results also reinforce the positive role of ICT within the new 
paradigm in which contemporary economies tend to operate (Freeman and Louçã, 
2001). It should be noted that spillovers have greater impact at the regional and national 
levels than at the international range, i.e., not only the diffusion is facilitated when both 
countries (imitated and imitator) show more similarities in terms of industries, as 
                                               
18
 This conclusion is also supported by Castellacci (2008), who acknowledges the severe difficulties faced 
by followers which possess very different productive and technological structures, combined with a 
reduced absorption capacity. 
19
 The sample includes Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Portugal, Spain and 
Taiwan, countries that, although showing several differences, had some similarities in their economic 
structures at the starting date of the study. These similarities emerged after a parameterization made by 
the authors based on different taxonomies ((Peneder, 2007; Tidd et al., 2005 and Robinson et al., 2003) in 
Silva and Teixeira, 2011) and on the common feature of a production structure primarily based on low-
skilled and low-tech industries. 
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mentioned by Laursen (2000), but also when they are geographically closer. Perez et al. 
(2011) conclude that not only large differences in spillovers elasticities in the long run 
exist, even among countries “technologically similar”, 20 but also the importance of 
technology diffusion increases with economic integration and declines due to 
geographical distance. Furthermore, Silva and Teixeira (2011) argue that producing is 
not the same as buying, so these effects of geographical proximity and similarity of 
structure have indeed a very important role in this matter. Within their sample, different 
trends can be found: cases of great success as the Asian countries; less successful 
examples such as Portugal; and countries characterized by mixed performances as Italy. 
Quatrato (2009) explores the transformations of the Italian productive structure between 
1981 and 2003. Grouping the various Italian regions into three main clusters and taking 
into account their geographical proximity along with a measure of similarity of the 
productive structure, the author analyses the evolution of these clusters, relating 
innovation, structural change and growth in a neo-Schumpeterian frame. Two main 
hypotheses are put forward: (i) early industrialized areas are fully involved in the 
generalized movement towards the knowledge-based economy; and (ii) due to the 
delayed expansion of manufacturing activities in late-industrialized areas, productivity 
growth and innovation take place within manufacturing sectors in these regions. Using 
econometric tests, with Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and sectorial variables in the 
regressions, the author confirms these hypotheses. Early industrialized areas show 
exhaustion in the growth potential of their more traditional industries, showing a 
transformation towards knowledge-intensive industries and services with high added 
value. In turn, late industrialized regions maintain their specialization in manufactures 
over time. Although they are adjusting to new challenges by innovating, manufacturing 
remains dominant. As a consequence, differences between the levels of productivity 
remain over time (Quatrato, 2009). 
However, despite this more pessimistic result, there are clear cases of success over the 
past decades, such as the Southeast Asian countries analysed in Silva and Teixeira 
(2011). In a few decades, these countries were able to transform their productive 
structures based on poorly differentiated products and cheap manpower into economies 
based on some high-tech sectors (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2004). 
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 Perez et al (2011) base their analysis on a sample composed by G5 between 1971 and 2003. 
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Positive results from structural change, associated with technological change result in a 
productivity growth bonus. The role of education is also essential for the performance 
of countries and favours better specializations. The results reported by Asian countries 
in this field are worth mentioning, explaining in part their success over the past decades 
(Silva and Teixeira, 2011). 
Table 2 presents a synthesis of the empirical studies analysed. Despite the distinct 
samples/methodologies used, an important finding emerges in all studies: the fact that 
technological upgrading, along with structural change directed to a greater importance 
of more innovative sectors, has played a key role in several economies over the last 
decades. These findings support the existence of a strong link between innovation, 
structural change and economic growth. Moreover, it is the combination of factors such 
as a “good” specialization, high education and technological levels, and an integrated 
combination of policies that explains the successful catching up of most follower 
economies. 
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Table 2: Highlights of the studies on structural change 
Study Main research goals 
Main mechanisms (SC-
growth) 
Methodology Variables Conclusions 
Fagerberg 
(2000) 
Measure the impact of 
specialization and 
structural change on 
productivity growth in 
manufacturing. 
Industry shifts towards sectors 
with higher technological 
intensity tend to generate higher 
productivity growth rates. 
Shift share analysis for a 
sample of 39 countries from 
the 5 continents, and 24 
industries between 1973 
and 1990.  Econometric 
regression to test the impact 
of “electronics revolution”. 
Shift-share analysis based on labour 
productivity growth. 
Spillovers of high tech industries, 
measured by: enrollment in education; 
share of investment in GDP; population 
size; and continental dummies. 
Shift share analysis shows no significant 
impact of structural change on 
productivity growth. Econometric results 
reveal important spillovers stemming from 
specialization in the high-tech sectors.  
Peneder 
(2003) 
Validate the impact of 
industrial structure on 
aggregate income and 
growth.  
Demand changes related with 
income elasticity of demand; 
industries upgrade; external 
effects to industries, such as 
spillovers; investments to 
expand demand. 
Shift-share analysis and 
econometric analysis using 
panel data. The sample 
includes 28 OECD 
countries, between 1990 
and 1998. 
 
Shift-share analysis: as in Fagerberg 
(2000). 
Panel data: GDP pc as dependent 
variable. Population on work age; 
employment rate; investment rate; 
average number of years in education; 
relative imports and exports rates in 
OECD as explanatory variables. 
Structural change impacts on economic 
growth (positive and/or negative). The 
structural bonus and structural burden of 
services, as predicted by Baumol, are 
confirmed by the model. Significant and 
positive impact of knowledge spillovers, 
using exports and imports shares in high-
tech sectors as their proxies. 
Amable 
(2000) 
Explore the relationship 
between trade and growth. 
Specialization in more 
advanced sectors tends to create 
more opportunities to growth. 
Panel data with 39 countries 
(OECD countries and some 
developing Asian and Latin 
America countries) from 
1965 to 1990. 
Growth rate of GDP pc as dependent 
variable. Explanatory variables: 3 
indicators of trade: inter-industry 
specialization, an index of trade 
dissimilarity and comparative advantage 
in electronics.  
The higher the specialization of the 
country at the inter-industry level, the 
higher the benefits in terms of economic 
growth. Specialisation and comparative 
advantage in electronics have a positive 
influence on productivity growth, with 
education reinforcing the positive effects 
from structure. 
Quatraro 
(2009) 
Investigate the shift 
towards the knowledge-
based economy through 
the relationships between 
innovation, structural 
change and productivity 
growth. 
The dynamic of re-allocation of 
labour force across different 
sectors generate increases on 
aggregate productivity; 
processes of innovation are 
crucial for competitiveness and 
f structural change.  
Econometric analysis with 
pooled data for three groups 
of Italian regions: North-
East-Center; North-West; 
and South, from 1981 to 
2003. 
TFP growth rate as dependent variable; 
and changes in employment share in 5 
sectors, namely: agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction, trade-
hotels-restaurants, real estate, financial 
and monetary intermediation, as 
explanatory variables.  
Late-industrialised regions still undergo a 
process of economic growth driven by the 
manufacturing sectors; 
In early-industrialised areas the service 
sector is now dominant. 
Silva and 
Teixeira 
(2011) 
Relate the growth 
experiences of countries 
which had similar 
economic structures in 
1970s with changes in 
their economic structures.  
Changes toward sectors with 
high level of knowledge and 
innovation originate higher 
increases on productivity and 
more economic growth  
Panel data with 10 
countries: Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, Austria, Ireland, 
Finland, Italy, Taiwan, 
South Corea and Japan 
between 1979 and 2003. 
GDP as dependent variable and 
education, investment and structural 
change index as explanatory variables. 
The type of specialization that the 
countries follow matters for growth. 
Countries that specialize in most 
knowledge-intensive sectors get better 
results. 
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Along with studies approaching general processes of structural change and growth for a 
cross-section of countries, a relativey small number of studies were also developed with 
a specific focus on the Portuguese case.  
Using a method of decomposition of the effects of structure and efficiency inspired by 
the shift share analysis previously described, Godinho and Mamede (2004) study the 
changes in the manufacturing sector in Portugal, Spain and Greece, based on the 
evolution of their levels of technological intensity. The authors use the OECD 
classification in order to distinguish manufacturing activities according to their 
technological intensity, namely: low, medium-low, medium-high and high.
 21
 They find 
that, between 1985 and 1994, Portugal improved its productivity in manufacturing from 
30% to 39% of the average of the reference group, composed by Germany, France, Italy 
and UK.
 
 Portugal was the only country that converged in productivity levels relative to 
the reference group, due to a good performance in the low-tech industries, subsector 
with the highest share in the countries under study. The authors also conclude that the 
evolution of the gap between the Cohesion Countries and the reference group has been 
determined by the performance of low-tech industries, rather than by that from more 
advanced sectors. Thus, Spain has significantly strengthened its component of high-tech 
industries, but has not been able to reduce its gap relative to the benchmark countries in 
the period under analysis. Finally, from the decomposition between the structure effect 
and the efficiency effect, Godinho and Mamede (2004) conclude that, especially in the 
cases of Portugal and Greece, the productivity gap relative to the reference group could 
be substantially reduced through the convergence of productivity levels within each 
sector, rather than major structural change. 
A different conclusion can be found in Lains (2008). The author uses also shift share 
techniques to compare the evolution of productivity and its components, between 1979 
and 2002, in Portugal and Ireland. While in Portugal the intra-sectorial effect and the 
static shift effect were clearly dominant, with a strong negative sign for the dynamic 
shift effect, in the Irish case there were strong within shift effect and dynamic shift 
effects, especially between 1994 and 2002. These results reveal that structural change 
has played a more important role in the evolution of productivity in Ireland than in 
                                               
21
 Technological intensity is defined as the ratio of business expenditure on R&D and value added. The 
values of the ratios for the above categories are: 0.9%, 2.3%, 9.35% and 22.5%, respectively. 
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Portugal, especially in the more recent years (Lains, 2008). The paths of Portugal and 
Ireland over the last few decades are also analysed by Fagerberg and Godinho (2004). 
They recall the importance of cultural issues, particularly the proximity between Ireland 
and the United States, which enabled this country to get strong investment by American 
multinationals, many of them linked to ICT. Moreover, the authors highlight the 
Portuguese backwardness in education to justify the different specialization followed by 
the country after entering the European Union (Fagerberg and Godinho, 2004). 
Another comparison commonly made is with the United States, often used as 
benchmark. In order to analyse the structural changes in the Portuguese economy in the 
last decades, Duarte and Restuccia (2007) develop a model to quantify these changes, in 
comparison with the United States. They consider three sectors (primary, secondary and 
services) that produce three goods: agriculture, manufacturing and services. Using a 
Cobb Douglas aggregate production function for both countries, they consider two main 
sources of structural transformation: non-homothetic preferences and an elasticity of 
substitution between consumption of manufacturing and service goods different from 
one (Duarte and Restuccia, 2007). 
Between 1956 and 1995, the labour productivity gap between Portugal and the United 
States fell from 26% of GDP per worker in 1956, to 53% in 1995. The results point to a 
significant evolution of productivity in manufacturing, but a much slower reduction in 
the productivity gap with respect to agriculture and services. Thus, the authors point to 
the manufacturing sector as the main responsible for the reduction in the productivity 
gap between Portugal and the United States but, at the same time, refer that the fact that 
this sector was losing weight in labour allocation had an important role in explaining the 
slow pace of convergence. In other words, the good performance of the manufacturing 
sector was not sufficient to further reduce the gap to the United States, since services 
increased their relative importance in the Portuguese economy. Efforts should therefore 
be directed towards improving productivity in the services sector, in order to achieve a 
more effective reduction of the productivity gap (Duarte and Restuccia, 2007). 
The notorious tertiarization trend observed in Portugal is also referred in Silva and 
Teixeira (2011). Although tertiarization is common to most developed countries and 
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abundantly documented in the literature,
22
 this process has worrying contours in the 
Portuguese case given the on-going nature of change, namely the tendency for a 
specialization in non-tradable services with weak technological and knowledge 
components (Silva and Teixeira, 2011). 
A different perspective can be found in Barros (2002), questioning the relevance of ICT 
for economic growth. The author finds that the contribution of more traditional 
industries is at least as significant for the convergence process within the EU as the 
ICT-related ones. However, there are several studies that point to the importance of the 
most technologically advanced sectors for a more efficient catching-up (e.g., Silva and 
Teixeira, 2011). Another important constraint of the Portuguese economy that, at least 
to a certain extent, explains the difficulty for the country to catch-up is education. As 
Silva and Teixeira (2011) noted, not only Portugal maintains a huge backwardness in 
relation to its European partners and external competitors, but this gap continues to 
increase, which explains the inability to adopt a growth model more focused on ICT.  
The role of education is essential for the performance of countries and favours a “best 
specialization”, as already mentioned. Pereira and Lains (2012) also address this issue, 
showing that despite the efforts of recent years, there is still a long way in the reduction 
of the education gap relative to Portugal’s European partners and external competitors. 
The education gap has a direct bearing on the country’s capability of fostering ICT 
related activities. A recent study from Veugelers and Mrak (2009) for the European 
Commission depicts the difficulties faced by Portugal in becoming a knowledge 
economy. The authors adopt the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), a 
composite measure of national performance based on four pillars considered as 
fundamental in the consolidation of a a Knowledge Economy, namely: 
(i) economic incentives and the institutional regime (EIC), based on tariff and non-
tariff barriers, regulatory quality, rule of law; 
(ii) education (EDU), measured by adult literacy, secondary and tertiary enrollment; 
                                               
22
 Jorgensen and Timmer (2011) revisit the stylized facts proposed by Kaldor (1967), Kuznets (1971) and 
Maddison (1980) (in Jorgensen and Timmer (2011)), and present a set of new evidence about the patterns 
of structural change in developed economies. The authors note that the services now represent about three 
quarters of GDP, agriculture passed to have an almost residual weight, and that there is a big 
heterogeneity within each sector. 
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(iii) innovation (INN), measured through royalty and license fee payments and receipts, 
USPTO Patent Applications and Scientific and Technical Journals; 
(iv) ICT, by Telephone, Computer and Internet access. 
Portugal is seen as a case of mixed performance. Among the countries analysed, 
Portugal presents the worst growth performance between 1995 and 2008. Despite the 
good performance in innovation, evidenced in the European Innovation Scoreboard 
ranking, education remains the major responsible for the overall negative results, 
showing a growing gap relative to the other countries analysed. The authors conclude 
that doing well in some indicators, but not in others, is not enough to achieve an overall 
good performance, emphasizing the important role of a systemic policy in order to 
achieve a Knowledge Based Economy. 
The table that follows presents a synthesis of studies focusing on the Portuguese case. A 
common conclusion is that the country has experienced significant change in its 
productive structure, but that did not translate into a path of specialization in high-tech 
sectors. Moreover, all studies point to the fact that the country’s relative backwardness 
in technology, along with a structure biased towards low-tech and low-skill sectors may 
hinder the country’s economic performance. 
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Table 3: Highlights of the studies on structural change in Portugal 
Study Main research goals Main mechanisms Methodology Variables Conclusions 
Godinho 
and 
Mamede 
(2004) 
Analyse the changes in the 
structure of the manufacturing 
industry of the Cohesion 
Countries in order to explain 
the different growth 
performances of these 
countries. 
Breakthroughs towards 
specialization in sectors 
with higher technological 
intensity tend to generate 
higher increases in 
productivity and, hence, to 
generate higher economic 
growth. 
Descriptive statistics and shift 
share analysis for three 
Cohesion Countries: Portugal, 
Spain and Greece. 
Share of labour in the 
different sectors, and 
sectorial productivity 
growth rates. 
 
Given the high relevance of low tech 
sectors in the workforce, 
productivity gains in this subsector 
determine the evolution of aggregate 
productivity growth. Still, the best 
performance of Portugal in this 
subsector is not sufficient to achieve 
convergence. 
Lains (2008) Analyse the structural shifts in 
order to explain different 
economic performances in 
Portugal and Ireland between 
1979 and 2002. 
The structural change 
towards more productive 
sectors and the shifts to 
industries with higher 
productivity growth 
stimulate economic growth. 
Shift share analysis  Sectorial labour shares and 
productivity growth rates. 
 
The main cause for the productivity 
differential between Portugal and 
Ireland is the differences in the 
sectorial composition of labour, 
rather than differences on the labour 
productivity levels. 
Duarte and 
Restuccia 
(2007) 
Based on an analytical model 
and its calibration, compare 
the evolution of productivity 
and structural changes that 
occurred between 1956 and 
1995 in the United States and 
Portugal. 
Productivity gains in 
industry 
generate earnings above 
those reached in other 
sectors. 
Model with a Cobb Douglas 
production function for 
Portugal and US, both 
producing three kinds of 
products. Calibration exercise, 
comparing the results of the 
model with effective data for 
US and Portugal, between 
1956 and 1995. 
GDP as endogenous 
variable depending on the 
capital stock, total hours 
worked, and TFP. 
Significant reduction of the gap 
between Portugal and the United 
States during the period under 
analysis, mainly due to the 
performance of the industrial sector. 
For convergence to be more 
effective, improvements in the 
tertiary sector are in order. 
Silva and 
Teixeira 
(2011) 
Relate the growth experiences 
of countries which had similar 
economic structures in 1970s 
with changes in their 
economic structures. 
Changes toward sectors with 
high level of knowledge and 
innovation originate higher 
additions on productivity 
and more economic growth. 
Panel data with 10 countries 
with similar economic 
structures in the late 1970s. 
GDP as dependent variable 
and education, investment 
and structural change index 
as explanatory variables. 
Portugal with specialization in non-
tradable services. The poor results on 
education reinforce the tendency of 
specialization in low skill sectors. 
Veugelers 
and Mrak 
(2009) 
Provide empirical evidence on 
catching-up and convergence 
processes inside the EU-27 
and analyse the main 
factors/sources of these 
processes. 
Although there is a positive 
correlation between 
innovation and economic 
Growth, there are also key 
flanking conditions 
for establishing a successful 
knowledge-for-growth 
nexus, such as education. 
Descriptive statistics for 
former cohesion countries and 
new East member states. 
Several indicators 
measuring the evolution in 
different fields such as 
education, innovation and 
international openness 
through FDI and 
international trade. 
Portugal has made great progress at 
the level of commitment to 
innovation, however the impact on 
economic growth is reduced since 
the performance in other key areas 
was weak. 
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 2.3.2. Studies based on the estimation of technology frontiers  
A number of studies analyse the technological evolution of countries, estimating 
technological frontiers (also regarded as production possibilities frontiers), which are 
then used to assess the distance of each country to the best practice.  
A seminal work in this field is from Fare et al. (1994). The authors use non-parametric 
methods, that is, methods that do not require the specification of the functional form of 
the production function, in the construction of a technological frontier, and then 
compute the distance of each country to the frontier. Under this methodology, shifts of 
the technological frontier are associated with innovation and technological change (Fare 
et al., 1994), whereas movements of a country towards the technological frontier are 
seen as processes of catching-up. The main goal of the authors is to distinguish between 
these two processes - innovation and catching-up - decomposing the productivity 
increases into technical and efficiency changes. The former are associated to innovation 
and to the shift up of the frontier, whereas the latter reflects catching-up paths. A 
Malmquist index
23
 is calculated to measure and decompose TFP in the two components 
of change and efficiency indicated above.  
On the methodological line of Fare et al. (1994), Kumar and Russel (2002) propose a 
method to study the role played by technology in convergence. Based on a sample of 57 
countries for the period between 1965 and 1990, the authors estimate a technological 
frontier using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This method consists of enveloping 
data in the smallest convex cone, being its upper limit the technological frontier, where 
the best practices are located.
 24
 As in Fare et al. (1994), the analysis is based on the 
distance between each country and the frontier. However, Kumar and Russell (2002) 
decompose the productivity increases into three separate components: technological 
change, technological catch-up and capital accumulation. The first component reflects 
shifts in the world production frontier (innovation/technology changes); the second 
reflects movements towards (or away from) the frontier, as countries improve (or 
reduce) their efficiency; and the third reflects movements along the frontier, e.g., 
changes in the capital-labour ratio (Kumar and Russel, 2002). 
                                               
23
 This index was first introduced by Malmquist (1953) in a consumption context analysis and by Caves et 
al. (1982) as a productivity index. 
24
 This methodology is described in more detail in Section 3.2. 
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The results point to a non-neutral role of technological change on convergence. 
Technological change creates greater potential for growth and shifts towards the 
technological frontier. However, this effect is not the same for all countries, tending to 
benefit more rich than poor countries. Some authors relate this finding with the role 
played by capital on the process: high levels of capital are required to promote 
technological change and since the richest countries are relatively capital abundant, they 
are likely to benefit more from technological change (Kumar and Russel, 2002). 
Using a similar procedure in a broader sample of 87 countries between 1960 and 1990, 
Kruger (2003) computes a Malmquist index, as in Fare et al. (1994), to calculate TFP 
and decompose productivity growth between efficiency gains and technological 
progress. Kruger concludes that OECD countries are the only group of countries which 
experience technological progress throughout the entire period under analysis. Two-
thirds of the productivity gains in these countries are due to technological change, 
although improvements in efficiency are also found. The author relates this result to the 
greater abundance of capital in OECD countries, in line with Kumar and Russell’s 
(2002) findings. 
Also using DEA, Los and Timmer (2005) decompose labour productivity growth into 
three components: localized innovation, assimilation of knowledge spillovers, and 
creation of capabilities to appropriate technology spillovers by investment (by 
technology upgrading), and investigate their role in the patterns of international 
convergence and divergence over time. The results for 53 countries between 1970 and 
1990 point to the importance of localized innovation, i.e., each technology is 
characterized by a given level of capital intensity, which in turn influences the 
maximum productivity associated with technology. Moreover, since more capital 
intensive technologies have greater potential productivity and the similarity between 
technologies is a constraint for the diffusion and assimilation of knowledge, the more 
advanced countries have a tendency to perpetuate their relative position (Los and 
Timmer, 2005). Once again, capital assumes preponderance, inducing a natural 
tendency for divergence. Economies with productive structures based on low capital-
intensive technologies not only face higher difficulties in achieving successful 
technological advances, but show also very low potential for growth through the 
absorption of spillovers. In line with technology-gap and social capabilities’ literature, 
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the assimilation of new technologies is a costly and slow process. Thus, many countries 
perform at labour productivity levels that are far from the technology frontier (Los and 
Timmer, 2005). One of these cases is Portugal. Although in 1990 the country presents 
some convergence in the capital per worker ratio, the productivity indices remained well 
below best practice countries. There is also a striking difference in behaviour between 
countries, according to their levels of capital intensity. Whereas those which produced 
above $ 7.000 per worker in the 1980s experienced a large increase in their GDP per 
capita, economies that were located at an intermediate level, such as Portugal, remained 
stagnant throughout that decade, and did not benefit from advances in the frontier. 
The authors emphasize that catching up through assimilation is possible, although at a 
slow pace, with assimilation rates being very heterogeneous across countries, in line 
with Los and Verspagen (2006) and Abramovitz (1986). Additionally, they stress the 
trade-off between assimilating knowledge specific to the technology currently in use, or 
investing in more advanced technologies. Although new technologies create the 
potential for higher productivity growth, they involve higher costs of starting a new 
process of assimilation. Decisions about what the best mix is in each moment requires 
thus a detailed analysis on the endowments and development prospects of the particular 
country under analysis (Los and Timmer, 2005). 
Along with physical capital, the authors emphasize the importance of human capital for 
technological upgrading and better assimilation of spillovers, an idea also supported by 
Maudos et al. (2003). This last paper, which analyses OECD countries between 1965 
and 1990, highlights the key contribution of human capital to economic growth: besides 
being a crucial input for the production process by increasing labour productivity, 
human capital plays an important role in fostering technological change (Maudos et al., 
2003). Interestingly enough, Portugal presents a higher average efficiency level when 
the variable human capital is not included, which is related to the country’s educational 
deficit that will be discussed in the previous section. 
The authors also calculate a Malmquist index considering real GDP as output and using 
labour, capital and human capital stocks as inputs. The latter factor is calculated as the 
number of schooling years completed by the occupied population, obtained as a product 
of the average schooling years of the population over 25 years of age and the number of 
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workers. They present both the value of the index and its components (technical change 
and efficiency change), as in Fare et al. (1994), for the whole period under analysis, 
1965-1990, and for shorter time intervals within this period.
25
 
Although Portugal’s performance between 1965 and 1990, as measured by the 
Malmquist index, is median, there are some discrepancies within sub periods. Portugal 
has one of the lower results with respect to efficiency change, which is even worse with 
respect to technical change between 1973 and 1985.
26
 However, there is an enormous 
progress in the subsequent period, between 1985 and 1990. In these five years, 
coincident with the country’s entry to the EEC, Portugal has the best result in the 
technical change component of all countries under analysis, which resulted in an 
average annual growth of the Malmquist index of 4,41% in this period, far above all 
other countries in the sample.
27
 
For the EU countries plus Norway between 1965 and 1998, Fare et al. (2006) perform a 
similar investigation to the one performed by Los and Timmer (2005). They note that, 
despite the equal possibility of access to technology (as tends to happen in the EU),
28
 
these countries show different capacities for innovation and technology adoption. In 
fact, a tendency for the creation of convergence clubs is found, i.e., groups of countries 
which are more alike tend to converge. The evidence does not indicate the creation of a 
single convergence club in the EU.  
The authors build an index similar to that developed by Kumar and Russel (2002), but 
decompose technological change into an output bias, an input bias and a “pure 
magnitude” component. The authors also test for the influence of human capital as a 
factor of production, but conclude that it plays a minor role, whereas the capital input is 
once more the main factor influencing productivity growth. The authors also stress the 
role of the input bias component as a divergence force. They argue that market and 
institutional reforms that occurred from the 1980s onwards generated differences across 
                                               
25
 The sub-periods considered are: 1965-73; 1973-85 and 1985-90. 
26
 Recall the troubled period with the political revolution in April 1974, the ongoing revolutionary period 
that followed (PREC), and the two interventions of the International Monetary Found (IMF) during this 
period. 
27
 Details about the Malmquist index are presented in Section 3.2. 
28
 Due to the economic liberalization programs and the creation of a common market. 
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countries which, in turn, led to different performances for each economy facing the 
challenges of technological progress (Fare et al., 2006). 
Still, the authors call attention to the fact that the poorest and less capital endowed 
economy (Portugal) is on the technological frontier during almost the whole period 
between 1969 and 1991. They explain this result with capital deepening during that 
period and the efficient use of resources available (in the case, highly labour-intensive). 
However, during the nineties, with some convergence to EU capital levels, the country 
moved away dramatically from the technological frontier. This fact is explained by the 
authors as a potential demonstration of the country’s inability to use efficiently the new 
mix of resources in the economy, i.e., namely capital and knowledge. 
The same authors present another study in 2007 enlarging the sample to the OECD 
countries and the time span from 1979 to 2002. In this case, Margaritis et al. (2007) do 
not include human capital as an input, but maintain the decomposition of growth in 
labour productivity into (i) net technological change (ii) input biased technical change 
(IBTC) (iii) efficiency change and (iv) capital accumulation. Again, as in Fare et al. 
(2006), the gaps in productivity and income levels are narrowed over time, but there is 
no evidence that the entire OECD area comprises a single convergence club. 
In line with the path already evidenced by Fare at al. (2006), Portugal registers the 
worst multifactor productivity performance (measured by a Malmquist index) of the 
OECD area between 1990 and 2002, due to a strong deterioration of the efficiency 
component. The country, which approached the technology frontier in the 1980s, 
departs sharply in the late 1990s, unlike, for example, Ireland, another Cohesion 
Country,  whose trajectory was far more favourable, as indicated in Lains (2008) and 
Fagerberg and Godinho (2004). 
Margaritis et al. (2007) also point out that, despite being the poorest and de-capitalized 
EU country, Portugal registers the highest rate of capital accumulation in the OECD 
sample. Between 1979 and 2002, the country doubled the capital intensity ratio. From 
1965 to 1998 the capital to labour ratio increased fivefold, while output per worker 
increased at about half this rate, in contrast with the case of Ireland, where labour 
productivity outpaced the rate of capital productivity (Margaritis et al. 2007). 
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Considering also a sample of OECD countries covering the period between 1970 and 
2000, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2010) replace the “traditional” production function by a 
production possibility frontier to analyse TFP. They consider GDP per worker as 
output, and three inputs, namely, human capital, public physical capital per worker and 
private physical capital per worker. They also introduce a non-discretionary input (an 
environment variable) as a proxy of public policy and government. The results point to 
an overall improvement of TFP, mostly due to the increase of efficiency. Afonso and St. 
Aubyn (2010) note that this increase occurs essentially in the eighties and nineties.
29
 
One of the countries that lies at the frontier in almost the entire period is Portugal even 
when different specifications are used. Nevertheless, they call attention to the relative 
human capital scarcity in Portugal (as in many studies indicated earlier), a factor that 
can potentially limit the country’s growth prospects. 
Table 4 summarizes the studies surveyed in this section, highlighting the conclusions 
regarding the Portuguese case. Some of these studies reinforce the conclusions drawn in 
the works using different methodologies surveyed in the previous sections (e.g., 
Portugal’s education gap). It becomes difficult, however, to draw single conclusions as 
to Portugal’s efficiency and technological performance, since some studies show 
contradictory results. Whereas some studies consistently put Portugal at the frontier, 
others highlight the country’s backwardness and technological deficit. There is, 
however, some agreement in a single and most important aspect: the sharp slowdown in 
the country’s performance in recent years, in accordance with the studies mentioned in 
the introductory chapter (e.g. Amaral, 2010). None of the surveyed studies covers the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, and therefore it is not possible to see whether 
this trajectory remained in the more recent past. In this context, it is our purpose to 
contribute to previous evidence on the matter, clarifying the apparent contradictions 
between different DEA studies, and extending the analysis to the last decade. Such an 
analysis is performed in the following chapter. 
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 The authors acknowledge the differences in results in relation to other studies. However, they call 
attention to the difficulties regarding comparison, due to the differences in the samples used. 
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Table 4: Portugal in DEA studies 
Study Sample Variables: inputs - outputs Data source Results regarding Portugal  
Kumar 
and Russel 
(2002) 
56 countries, including 
developing countries and 
newly industrialized 
countries (NICs) as well as 
the original OECD countries, 
between 1965 and 1990. 
Inputs: Capital stock and labour (employment) retrieved from 
capital stock per worker and real GDP per worker (KAPW 
and RGDPW). Real GDP and the capital stock are measured 
in 1985 international prices. 
Output: Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDPCH multiplied 
by POP) 
Penn World Tables (version 
5.6), (Robert Summers and 
Alan Heston, 1991). 
Not referenced directly. However, presents levels 
of efficiency in the mean of the sample for 1965 
(0,65) and slightly higher in 1990 (0,78). High 
percentage change in output per worker largely 
due to the impact of capital deepening. 
Maudos et 
al. (2003) 
OECD countries between 
1965 and 1990. 
Labour input measured by total employment, computed from 
real GDP per worker; total capital stock calculated from non-
residential capital per worker; and human capital stock 
calculated as the number of schooling years completed by the 
occupied population obtained as a product of the average 
schooling years of the population over 25 years of age and 
the number of workers. 
The output is the real GDP in 1985 international prices 
Penn World Table 5.6 
(Summers and Heston, 
1991) for GDP, capital 
stocks and labour input; and 
Barro and Lee (1993) for 
human capital. 
Efficiency level of the country is negatively 
influenced by the introduction of the human 
capital variable. The Malmquist index indicates 
an average performance for the period under 
analysis. However, it is relevant to emphasize the 
particulary negative results between 1973-1985 
and the excellent performance in the period 
immediately after between 1985 and 1990. 
Los and 
Timmer 
(2005) 
53 countries, including 
OEDC countries between 
1965 and 1990. 
Inputs: Capital stocks -stocks of producer durables calculated 
as the non-residential capital stock per worker (series 
KAPW) multiplied by the share of producer durables in the 
stock (series KDUR).  
Labour (number of workers), dividing real GDP (series 
RGDPCH) by real GDP per worker (series RGDPW). 
Output: GDP per worker at PPP. 
Penn World Tables (PWT) 
Mark 5.6. 
Portugal in the middle of the table relative to 
labour productivity. 
Portugal is also one of the economies which stood 
at an intermediate value of capital intensity 
(between $700 and $4.400 per worker) that 
presented stagnation throughout the eighties at the 
technology level, not -benefiting from the 
advances observed in the technological frontier. 
Fare et al. 
(2006) 
15 EU members plus Norway 
between 1965 and 1998. 
Inputs: labour, capital stock and human capital as a 
multiplicative augmentation of raw labour. 
Output: real GDP. 
Real GDP, labour and most 
capital series are from 
PWT5.6 and the provisional 
PWT6.0. Levels of 
schooling are from Barro 
and Lee (2000). 
Efficiency score of Portugal benefits from the 
human capital adjustment. Portugal at the frontier 
from 1969-1982 and 1989-1991 due to efficiency 
improvements and capital deepening, but losing 
the position after that period. 
Margaritis 
et al. 
(2007) 
OECD countries between 
1979 and 2002. 
Real GDP as output measure and labour and capital stock as 
inputs. 
Aggregate output and 
employment data for most 
countries are from Total 
Economy Database 
Of Groningen University. 
Portugal registers the worst Multifactor 
Productivity performance (measured by a 
Malmquist index) of the OECD between 1990 and 
2002, due to the strong deterioration of the 
efficiency component. 
Afonso 
and 
St.Aubyn 
(2010) 
OECD countries between 
1970 and 2000. 
Inputs: public capital per worker; private capital per worker; 
human capital (average years of schooling). 
Output: GDP per worker PPS. 
AMECO for GDP, labour 
and capital stocks. Cohen 
and Soto (2007) for human 
capital. 
Portugal lies at the frontier through the entire 
period, even when different combinations of 
inputs are considered 
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Chapter 3 –An empirical analysis of the Portuguese case 
 3.1. Methodological considerations 
In the previous chapters we surveyed a number of studies that analysed the topics of 
convergence and structural and technological change, based on different methodologies 
(estimation of production frontiers, econometric techniques - time series, cross section 
and panel data estimation, calibration models and pure accounting techniques as shift-
share analysis). The discussion about the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
each method is recurrent and has no single answer. However, from the analysis made so 
far, and having in mind the main objective of our study, we can draw some conclusions 
about the limitations of using some of these methodologies. For instance, shift-share 
analysis, which at a first glance would be ideal to measure the effects of structural 
change, suffers from the problems described in Peneder (2003), namely its tendency to 
underestimate the impact of structural change, due to the non-consideration of spillover 
effects.
30
 
Relative to time series and cross section studies, which restrict the analysis to a path of a 
particular country over time or to the comparison of countries in a specific moment in 
time, respectively, panel data analysis has the advantage of combining simultaneously 
the two dimensions, enriching the potential of the analysis (Gujarati, 2004). 
Furthermore, as Islam (2003) argues, panel data is one of the most appropriate 
methodologies for the study of convergence. There is, however, abundant literature 
using this methodology, as seen in our survey, and therefore, the use of panel data in 
this case would be of limited value. 
With regard to production frontier analysis, most particularly, using DEA, to our 
knowledge, no evidence has been presented focusing specifically on the Portuguese 
case. Previous studies using this methodology and including Portugal in the sample of 
countries found, moreover, mixed results. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
Margaritis et al. (2007) identifies Portugal as the OECD country with the worst TFP 
performance since the nineties, whereas Afonso and St. Aubyn (2010) present Portugal 
as a country with a stable rank on the technological frontier over the whole sample 
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period (1970-2000). The inconsistency of results, along with the lack of a specific 
analysis of the Portuguese case, extending the results to the more recent data available, 
led us to opt in favour of this methodolgy. 
The estimation of non-parametric production frontiers presents a series of advantages 
when compared to other methods, such as growth accounting, due to its less stringent 
assumptions. It does not require any assumptions with respect to efficiency, functional 
form, market structure, or factor price information, allowing for the decomposition of 
the technology gap into changes in productive efficiency and technological progress 
(Kruger, 2003).  
Relative to Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), it has also a number of advantages. 
Although SFA allows dealing with measurement errors, it requires the specification of 
the functional form of the production function, along with a number of assumptions in 
order to separate the distance relative to the frontier function from eventual 
measurement errors (Kruger, 2003). Moreover, the strength of SFA is questionable in 
small and medium sized samples, as the one used in the present work, as demonstrated 
by some Monte Carlo studies, such as Gong and Sickles (1992) and Banker et al. 
(1993). In these circumstances, although DEA possesses also some drawbacks, namely 
its greater sensitivity to outliers,
31
 we decided in favour of this approach. 
 
 3.2. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology 
In simple terms, the DEA estimation procedure consists in building a technological 
frontier and measuring the distances between each country and the frontier, for a 
defined sample.   
Considering that, at each time period t, a vector of inputs 
tx produce the output ty , 
under constant returns of scale,
32
  the technological frontier
tS is given by: 
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 Cf. Kumar and Russell (2002). 
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 According to Fare et al. (1998) the assumption of constant returns of scale is the best option to measure 
TFP using a Malmquist index. Also Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1995) argue that the presence of non-
constant returns to scale bias the results of Malmquist indexes. 
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Where: 
 S represents the technological frontier;  
 x is input vector; 
 y is output vector; 
 k is country, k= 1,…,K; 
 z is the intensity variable and; 
 t is the time period, t = 1,…,T;. 
The frontier represents the best practice; after its calculation we can measure the output 
distance function 
tD0  
between each country and the best practice in t, maximizing the 
output vector ty given inputs 
tx (output oriented estimation), or minimizing the inputs 
for a given output (input oriented estimation).
33
 
  10 }),(:max{})/,(:min{),(

 ttttttttt SyxSyxyxD   (3.2) 
When production is technically efficient, ),(0
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Values below 1 indicate that a country is not at the frontier, being therefore inefficient.  
In order to decompose that distance into efficiency and technical change components 
we use a Malmquist index 0M , as in Fare et al. (1994): 
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The ratio outside the brackets measures the change in relative efficiency (i.e., the 
change in the distance between the observed output and the maximum potential output), 
in the time period from t up to t+1. The geometric mean of the two ratios inside the 
brackets captures the shift in technology between the two periods (Fare et al., 1994). A 
value of 0M above unity reflects improvements in productivity, whereas the opposite 
stands for values below one. Likewise, improvements in any of the components of the 
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index are associated with values above unity, whereas values below one indicate a 
negative performance of that particular component (Fare et al., 1994).  
It is also important to note that each country is compared to its previous year’s 
performance, relative to the frontier derived from the data. More precisely, if a country 
does not change its inputs and outputs from t to t+1, then it will have no change in 
productivity, but if the frontier shifts from t to t+1, indicating overall technical change, 
the country will be farther away from the frontier.
34
  
 
 3.3. The construction of a technology frontier 
3.3.1. Sample and variables 
The Sample 
In defining our sample, we took into account several aspects. First of all, since the main 
objective of this study is to analyse the growth dynamics of Portugal and its relationship 
with technological change, we decided to restrict our sample to comparable countries, 
that is, countries which, as Portugal, are classified as developed economies. It is our 
purpose to have a more accurate description of the global technological frontier, to the 
extent that it seems more reasonable to see it as being essentially composed by the most 
developed countries in the world.  
The elimination of less developed countries has the additional advantage of reducing the 
potential inclusion of outliers, which as indicated above, influence considerably DEA 
results, limiting as well the impact of measurement errors, since the statistics from these 
countries are generally less reliable than those of developed economies. Moreover, in 
less developed countries, GDP values can be affected by factors such as natural 
resources, which make them slightly related to technological issues.  
More developed countries possess, furthermore, more ample coverage in terms of the 
availability of data over time, which allows for an analysis of the influence of structural 
and technological change on economic growth, which constitutes our fundamental 
research purpose.  
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Taking these considerations in mind, we use a sample comprising the following 19 
countries: Portugal, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and 
USA. 
In order to better investigate the origin of the observed discrepancies between the 
studies indicated above, and taking into account that one of the critical factors that may 
explain these differences concerns the choice and selection of data, we decided to 
perform our estimation in two steps. 
1) Initially we estimate the technological frontier and construct a Malmquist index 
based on data provided by the Penn World Table (PWT), the main source of the 
studies mentioned above. Data is taken from the latest release of this database (PWT 
(8.0)). Taking advantage of the wide availability of data provided by PWT, in this 
first stage we consider a long period, analyzing the evolution of the Portuguese 
economy between 1970 and 2010.  
2) Because PWT does not take into account a number of variables that are nowadays 
included in aggregate production functions, in a second phase we use the OECD 
database, which provides directly comparable data for the aforementioned countries 
over the last two decades (1990-2010). The use of a different and equally reliable 
data source allow us furthermore to test for the robustness of previous findings 
relative to the Portuguese economy, and to explore eventual differences in the 
results stemming from the use of different data. 
The Variables 
Labour 
Along with capital, labour is the input whose relevance for the production gathers 
greater consensus, having their roots in the Labour Theory of Value, developed by 
David Ricardo in the beginning of the nineteenth century. We consider total hours 
worked, multiplying the average number of hours worked per worker by the total 
number of employees, both when using PWT and OECD data.  
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Physical Capital 
Physical capital is always present in the surveyed DEA studies, being recurrently 
pointed out as the key factor explaining the dynamics of technological change. The 
variable used to proxy capital varies, however, across studies.  
In this respect, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) is not an adequate proxy, since it 
considers only the actual flow of investment, ignoring older investment vintages. Thus, 
as has been noted, the vast majority of studies use a measure of the stock of capital. The 
use of capital stocks requires, however, additional considerations. The analysis of 
production and productivity issues requires the use of an estimate of capital as a factor 
of production, rather than a store of wealth. More precisely, it is advisable to compute a 
measure of productive capital, which takes into account the productive efficiency of 
capital assets (OECD, 2001; Silva, 2010). 
Taking into account these considerations, in the first stage of the estimation we use a 
more refined measure of capital stock available in the new version of the PWT database 
(Feenstra et al., 2013). Then, in the second stage we use the productive capital stocks 
provided by the OECD (OECD, 2013).  
  Human Capital 
Along with physical capital and labour, a factor that gathers increasing consensus about 
its importance to economic growth is human capital.
35
 
However, its inclusion in empirical models is hampered in many occasions due to the 
scarcity and quality of existing data (de la Fuente and Doménech, 2006). In the 
construction of our database such difficulties were also present, and therefore we 
decided to use two different data sources for this variable: the average years of 
schooling from Barro and Lee (2010), and those from de la Fuente and Doménech 
(2012), in order to check for the robustness of results.
36
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used methodology (e.g., Silva and Teixeira, 2011 and Maudos et al., 2003). 
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 Both sources present data with five year intervals. In order to obtain annual data we calculate the 
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Table 5 illustrates the Portuguese educational gap relative to the sample average.
37
 The 
two proxies of human capital show some differences in levels, although the trends are 
similar. 
Table 5: Education statistics 
 de la Fuente and Doménech (2012) Barro and Lee (2010) 
 Sample Portugal Sample Portugal 
Mean 11,830 7,402 11,854 6,753 
Median 11,799 7,394 11,853 6,680 
Maximum 12,470 8,880 12,038 7,730 
Minimum 11,330 5,946 11,651 5,821 
Std. Dev. 0,350 0,897 0,103 0,543 
     
Observations 456 24 456 24 
In line with Maudos et al. (2003), we make an adaptation to the indicator, multiplying 
the average years of schooling by the number of people employed in a given year. By 
doing so, a clear notion of the level of schooling of the population employed in each 
country is obtained. 
Innovation 
Another key factor for growth is innovation, as previously indicated in our survey (e.g., 
Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). Although the inclusion of this variable in econometric 
studies is becoming increasingly common, its use in DEA is still incipient. 
We use Gross Expenditures on Research and Development (GERD) (see Table 6) to 
proxy innovation, a variable closely connected with technological change, and which 
allows furthermore for the analysis of the efficiency of R&D expenditure. 
In the first step, using PWT database, only two inputs are considered: physical capital 
and labour, from 1970 to 2010. Then, in the second step, we introduce new inputs: 
human capital and innovation, based on OECD data. Table 6 summarizes the variables 
used in the estimation of the technological frontier. 
The next section presents our estimation results. 
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Table 6: List of variables used 
PWT Variables Definition Source 
Labour 
Total number of hours worked, obtained as the product between the 
number of persons engaged (in millions) and the average annual 
hours worked by person engaged. 
 
PWT version 8.0 
http://www.ggdc.net/pwt 
 
Ck Capital stock at current reference prices (in mil. 2005US$).
38
 
Rgdpe 
Gross Domestic Product - Expenditure-side at constant 2005 
reference prices (in mil. 2005US$) 
OECD Variables   
Capital Productive capital stock.
39
 
OECD database, 
http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
Labour 
Average annual hours actually worked per worker multiplied by total 
civilian employment. 
Gerd 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) in constant 2005 US$. 
GERD consists of the total expenditure (current and capital) on R&D 
by all resident companies, research institutes, university and 
government laboratories, etc. It excludes R&D expenditures financed 
by domestic firms but performed abroad. 
HK 
Average years of schooling of the adult population of OECD 
countries multiplied by total civilian employment. 
De la Fuente and 
Doménech (2012) and 
http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Gdp 
Gross domestic product (expenditure approach) 2005 US$, constant 
prices, constant PPPs, OECD  millions 
OECD database, 
http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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 More information about PWT capital stocks at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/v80/capital_labor_and_tfp_in_pwt80.pdf, pp. 12-16, accessed on 13-07-
2013). 
39
 For further details about productive capital stocks calculations see OECD manual (2001), pp. 61-65 and 132-133. 
Portuguese economic growth revisited: a technology-gap explanation 
 45 
3.3.2. Estimation results 
PWT data, 1970-2010 
The first set of results, computed using PWT data, and considering an input orientation 
and constant returns to scale are presented in Table 7.
 40
 
Table 7: Efficiency Indexes 1970-2010 (selected years) 
Countryry 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Australia 0,837 0,840 0,879 0,863 0,813 0,793 0,770 0,753 0,872 
Austria 1,000 1,000 0,996 0,735 0,762 0,812 0,795 0,739 0,787 
Belgium 0,781 0,873 1,000 0,857 0,964 1,000 0,986 0,843 0,842 
Canada 0,971 1,000 1,000 0,943 0,896 0,870 0,876 0,857 0,943 
Denmark 0,826 0,791 0,839 0,876 0,816 0,826 0,846 0,736 0,788 
Finland 0,647 0,623 0,646 0,670 0,671 0,699 0,756 0,681 0,720 
France 0,788 0,850 0,864 0,849 0,892 0,877 0,945 0,798 0,814 
Germany 0,653 0,744 0,798 0,772 0,844 0,868 0,843 0,797 0,863 
Greece 0,687 0,667 0,656 0,721 0,648 0,653 0,594 0,602 0,726 
Ireland 0,902 0,961 0,870 0,893 0,861 0,859 1,000 1,000 0,882 
Italy 0,755 0,797 0,915 0,858 0,821 0,810 0,776 0,650 0,701 
Japan 0,908 0,797 0,759 0,846 0,828 0,722 0,646 0,604 0,659 
Netherlands 0,771 0,891 0,934 0,910 0,879 0,872 0,963 0,859 0,855 
Norway 0,807 0,819 0,889 0,876 0,853 0,858 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Portugal 1,000 0,971 0,996 0,768 0,804 0,769 0,576 0,519 0,582 
Spain 0,903 0,926 0,814 0,832 0,852 0,777 0,775 0,702 0,681 
Sweden 1,000 0,997 0,941 0,927 0,918 0,926 0,951 0,908 1,000 
United 
Kingdom 
0,708 0,827 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,955 0,899 0,902 
United 
States 
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,960 0,908 1,000 
As stated in the previous section, the lower the values, the higher the distance relative to 
the frontier, with values equal to 1 indicating maximum efficiency. 
Some comparison between our results and those found in previous studies can be made, 
although some caution is required, due to the fact that the countries considered in the 
samples are not the same.
41
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Some findings are similar, namely the almost continuous presence of the U.S. at the 
frontier. Japan, on the other hand, presents results well below the technological frontier, 
indicating low efficiency in the use of resources, a pattern also found by Kumar and 
Russel (2002) and Los and Timmer (2005). Another interesting case is Finland. Being 
one of the most successful cases in the EU in recent decades, Finland presents results 
well below the technological frontier, also in line with previous evidence (Maudos et 
al., 2003). 
The main focus in this work is, however, the Portuguese case. The following graph 
illustrates the gap between Portugal and the technological frontier over the period 1970 
to 2010. 
Figure 3: Evolution of the efficieny level of Portugal 1970-2010 
 
 
Figure 3 is quite illustrative about Portugal’s standing relative to the technological 
frontier during the last 40 years. Portugal presents a good performance between 1970 
and 1980, as in Fare et al. (2006), which reveals an efficient use of the scarce resources 
available at the time (particularly, with respect to capital) and the capital deepening path 
that occurred during that period. A strong downward path occurs in subsequent decades, 
also in line with the results from Fare et al. (2006) and Margaritis et al. (2007), but 
contrasting with the evidence shown in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2010). 
In order to analyse in more detail the Portuguese growth trajectory, we decompose the 
distance to the frontier into a technology change effect (techch) and an efficiency effect 
(effch) using a Malmquist index (cf. Equation 3.3). As in Fare et al. (1994), we also 
decompose the efficiency effect in “pure efficiency change” (pech) and “scale change” 
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effects (sech). Improvements in any of the components of the index are associated with 
values above unity, whereas values below one indicate a negative performance of that 
particular component over time. Subtracting 1 from the value obtained, we get the 
annual average increase (or decrease) of the performance of the component under 
analysis.  
The results obtained, using the Data Envelopment Analysis Computer Program (DEAP 
V 2.1) developed by Tim Coelli
42
 show that, on average, there was technological 
progress both in the extended period between 1970 and 2010, as well as in the last two 
decades of this period (cf. Table 8). The results point to a decline, albeit slight, in the 
efficiency component, which to a certain extent is compensated by the scale effect. 
Portugal presents a Malmquist index (tfpch) below unity in the four decade period, and 
in the last twenty years, showing a sustained decline in total factor productivity growth. 
It is interesting to note that the efficiency performance was higher when considering the 
whole period under study. This may somehow explain the increasing gap that Portugal 
presented relative to the technological frontier in recent decades. 
On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning that it was precisely over the last two 
decades that the country presented a better performance in the technological change 
component, although that has not been sufficient to entitle a position on the best-
practice frontier. 
Table 8: Malmquist index and their components using PWT 
Country 
Time 
period 
effch techch pech sech tfpch 
Australia 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,001 
1,004 
1,004 
1,007 
1,000 
1,003 
1,001 
1,001 
1,005 
1,011 
Austria 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,994 
1,002 
0,999 
1,006 
0,994 
0,999 
1,000 
1,002 
0,993 
1,007 
Belgium 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,002 
0,993 
1,008 
1,013 
1,001 
0,993 
1,001 
1,000 
1,010 
1,007 
Canada 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,999 
1,003 
1,001 
1,002 
1,000 
1,005 
0,999 
0,998 
1,000 
1,004 
Denmark 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,999 
0,998 
1,004 
1,006 
0,998 
0,994 
1,001 
1,004 
1,003 
1,004 
Finland 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,003 
1,004 
1,005 
1,010 
1,001 
0,999 
1,002 
1,005 
1,008 
1,013 
France 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,001 
0,995 
1,007 
1,012 
1,002 
1,001 
0,999 
0,994 
1,008 
1,008 
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Germany 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,007 
1,001 
1,003 
1,007 
1,006 
1,001 
1,001 
1,000 
1,010 
1,008 
Greece 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,001 
1,006 
0,995 
1,001 
1,002 
1,005 
0,999 
1,001 
0,997 
1,007 
Ireland 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,999 
1,001 
0,993 
1,002 
1,000 
1,000 
0,999 
1,001 
0,993 
1,003 
Italy 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,998 
0,992 
1,004 
1,012 
0,996 
0,994 
1,002 
0,998 
1,002 
1,004 
Japan 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,992 
0,989 
0,995 
1,003 
0,990 
0,985 
1,002 
1,003 
0,988 
0,992 
Netherlands 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,003 
0,999 
1,004 
1,007 
1,003 
0,999 
0,999 
1,000 
1,007 
1,006 
Norway 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,005 
1,008 
1,013 
1,019 
1,000 
1,000 
1,005 
1,008 
1,018 
1,027 
Portugal 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,987 
0,984 
0,993 
1,002 
0,989 
0,985 
0,998 
0,999 
0,979 
0,986 
Spain 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,993 
0,989 
0,999 
1,007 
0,993 
0,994 
1,000 
0,995 
0,992 
0,995 
Sweden 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,000 
1,004 
1,000 
1,002 
1,000 
1,002 
1,000 
1,002 
1,000 
1,007 
United 
Kingdom 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,006 
0,995 
1,000 
1,005 
1,004 
0,997 
1,002 
0,998 
1,007 
1,000 
United States 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
1,000 
1,000 
1,007 
1,006 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1,007 
1,006 
       
Mean 
1970-2010 
1990-2010 
0,999 
0,998 
1,002 
1,007 
0,999 
0,998 
1,001 
1,000 
1,001 
1,005 
Although the results for the average of the sample show a globally positive evolution of 
TFP measured by the Malmquist index, the results for Portugal point to a deterioration 
of the performance over the last few decades. 
OECD data, 1990-2010 
In order to get a more appropriate description of the production possibilities frontier we 
now use the OECD database considering, along with physical capital (K) and labour 
(L), human capital (HK) and R&D inputs. The use of a different data source will allow 
us furthermore to test for the robustness of the previously estimated results. 
Table 9 presents the efficiency results of the countries included in the sample between 
1990 and 2010 using the new database. As in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2010), we 
estimate the distances relative to the frontier using different combinations of the 
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considered inputs. We start by using only physical capital and labour, as in the previous 
calculus, adding afterwards human capital and GERD.
 43
 
Table 9: Efficiency Indexes 1990-2010 (selected years) 
Country Inputs 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Australia 
Capital and Labour 0,673 0,731 0,761 0,797 0,757 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,830 0,797 0,822 0,797 0,770 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,718 0,731 0,766 0,797 0,780 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,830 0,797 0,822 0,797 0,780 
Austria 
Capital and Labour 0,725 0,780 0,786 0,801 0,763 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,817 0,789 0,794 0,801 0,763 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,755 0,784 0,810 0,823 0,807 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,817 0,789 0,810 0,823 0,807 
Belgium 
Capital and Labour 0,896 1,000 1,000 0,988 0,903 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,988 0,903 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,988 0,938 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,988 0,938 
Canada 
Capital and Labour 0,765 0,814 0,798 0,785 0,728 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,844 0,822 0,814 0,785 0,833 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,767 0,816 0,798 0,785 0,728 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,844 0,822 0,814 0,785 0,833 
Denmark 
Capital and Labour 0,705 0,702 0,682 0,657 0,693 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,782 0,724 0,682 0,657 0,693 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,723 0,733 0,682 0,734 0,751 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,782 0,734 0,682 0,734 0,751 
Finland 
Capital and Labour 0,711 0,759 0,762 0,774 0,725 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,723 0,763 0,762 0,774 0,725 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,716 0,762 0,762 0,774 0,757 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,723 0,763 0,762 0,774 0,757 
France 
Capital and Labour 0,882 0,971 0,964 0,953 0,877 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,887 0,971 0,964 0,953 0,877 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,930 0,976 0,964 0,953 0,877 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,930 0,976 0,964 0,953 0,877 
Germany 
Capital and Labour 1,000 1,000 0,985 0,971 0,891 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 0,985 0,971 0,891 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 0,985 0,971 0,891 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 0,985 0,971 0,891 
Greece 
Capital and Labour 1,000 0,981 0,974 0,944 0,856 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 0,999 0,992 0,936 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Ireland 
Capital and Labour 0,813 0,912 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,873 0,944 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,826 0,919 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,873 0,944 1,000 1,000 1,000 
                                               
43
 The results were calculated based on de la Fuente and Doménech’s (2012) data on human capital. The 
results do not differ when use is made of Barro and Lee’s (2010) data. 
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Italy 
Capital and Labour 0,895 0,971 0,879 0,804 0,720 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,932 0,986 0,987 0,976 0,997 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,974 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,961 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,974 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Japan 
Capital and Labour 0,563 0,534 0,517 0,507 0,559 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,563 0,534 0,517 0,507 0,559 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,636 0,628 0,575 0,659 0,670 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,636 0,628 0,575 0,659 0,670 
Netherlands 
Capital and Labour 0,954 1,000 0,991 0,989 0,933 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,998 1,000 0,991 0,989 0,933 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,960 1,000 0,991 0,989 0,933 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,998 1,000 0,991 0,989 0,933 
Norway 
Capital and Labour 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Portugal 
Capital and Labour 0,765 0,778 0,751 0,674 0,706 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,770 0,883 0,897 0,822 0,769 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,863 0,929 0,872 0,775 0,798 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,864 0,941 0,912 0,827 0,821 
Spain 
Capital and Labour 0,974 0,983 0,836 0,738 0,711 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,917 0,949 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 0,979 0,909 0,954 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 0,933 0,984 
Sweden 
Capital and Labour 0,655 0,615 0,627 0,634 0,671 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,655 0,615 0,627 0,634 0,671 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,668 0,657 0,627 0,701 0,723 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,673 0,657 0,627 0,701 0,723 
United 
Kingdom 
Capital and Labour 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour and HK 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
United 
States 
Capital and Labour 0,853 0,938 0,940 0,963 0,923 
Capital, Labour and Gerd 0,855 0,938 0,940 0,963 0,923 
Capital, Labour and HK 0,856 0,940 0,940 0,963 0,923 
Capital, Labour, HK and Gerd 0,856 0,940 0,940 0,963 0,923 
Although there are a few cases, such as Norway and UK, which remain in the frontier 
along the whole period, independently of the combination of inputs considered, most 
countries show some sensitivity to the choice of inputs. Spain and Italy’ results, for 
example, improve significantly when additional inputs are considered, along with 
physical capital and labour. 
Once again, Japan is the country with worst performance. The results improve slightly 
when human capital is included, thereby mitigating the (negative) effect of physical 
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capital, factor which is extremely abundant in Japan, but which apparently does not 
translate into higher production. 
As it would be expected, average results improve when a larger set of factors is 
considered. This general trend reflects a tendency to converge to the technological 
frontier countries by the followers, decreasing the technological gap between countries. 
Portugal is no exception, being one of the countries that have a more significant relative 
improvement when considering human capital and R&D inputs, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Evolution of the level of efficiency of Portugal 1990-2010 
 
 
After a slightly positive trend until the mid-1990s, the country shows a divergent 
trajectory in relation to technological frontier. This trajectory is common to all 
combinations of inputs considered: i.e., there are differences in levels, but not in trends. 
As done previously with recourse to PWT data, we construct a Malmquist index to 
decompose the distance to the frontier into a technology change effect (techch) and 
efficiency effect (effch), then dividing the efficiency effect into “pure” efficiency (pech) 
and scale efficiency effect (sech). 
The results show the good behaviour of the technical change component, which 
increases at about 0,6% per year during the period under analysis. Australia, Finland 
and France show particularly good performances. During the last two decades, and 
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considering the four inputs, technological change has been, on average, the major 
engine of TFP growth. 
Table 10: Malmquist index and their components using OECD data 1990-2010 (4 inputs) 
Country effch techch pech sech tfpch 
Australia 0,997 1,015 1,003 0,994 1,012 
Austria 0,999 1,008 1,000 0,999 1,008 
Belgium 0,997 1,010 1,000 0,997 1,007 
Canada 0,999 1,009 1,003 0,996 1,008 
Denmark 0,998 1,007 0,999 0,999 1,005 
Finland 1,002 1,015 1,000 1,003 1,017 
France 0,997 1,014 1,003 0,994 1,011 
Germany 0,994 1,012 1,000 0,994 1,006 
Greece 1,000 0,980 1,000 1,000 0,980 
Ireland 1,007 1,010 1,000 1,007 1,017 
Italy 1,001 0,996 1,000 1,001 0,997 
Japan 1,003 1,006 0,997 1,006 1,008 
Netherlands 0,997 1,013 1,000 0,997 1,010 
Norway 1,000 1,010 1,000 1,000 1,010 
Portugal 0,997 0,992 0,997 1,000 0,989 
Spain 0,999 0,991 1,000 1,000 0,990 
Sweden 1,004 1,013 1,005 0,999 1,016 
United 
Kingdom 
1,000 1,003 1,000 1,000 1,003 
United States 1,004 1,012 1,000 1,004 1,016 
      Mean 1,000 1,006 1,000 0,999 1,006 
Portugal, however, has the worst performance in this particular component. The 
following table presents the Malmquist index decomposition based on different 
combinations of inputs. 
Table 11: Malmquist index and their components for Portugal (OECD data 1990-2010) 
Country Inputs effch techch pech sech tfpch 
Portugal 
Sample Mean 
Capital, Labour 
 
0,996 
0,999 
0,990 
1,011 
1,003 
1,000 
0,993 
0,998 
0,986 
1,010 
Portugal 
Sample Mean 
Capital, Labour and 
Gerd 
1,000 
0,999 
0,996 
1,008 
0,999 
1,000 
1,001 
0,999 
0,996 
1,007 
Portugal 
Sample Mean 
Capital, Labour and 
HK 
0,996 
1,000 
0,996 
1,008 
0,997 
1,000 
0,999 
1,000 
0,992 
1,008 
Portugal 
Sample Mean 
Capital, Labour, HK 
and Gerd 
0,997 
1,000 
0,992 
1,006 
0,997 
1,000 
1,000 
0,999 
0,989 
1,006 
The results show that, regardless of the inputs considered, the performance of Portugal 
is below the average between 1990 and 2010.  
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Figure 5 illustrates more clearly the evolution of the Malmquist index and of its 
components over the last two decades. The four graphs report different trajectories. In 
common, there is a strong decline in the Malmquist index at the beginning of the 1990s. 
After this period, the trends start to vary, being difficult to identify a common pattern. 
The inclusion of R&D expenditure seems to accentuate the disparities between 
efficiency and technological change effects. When one of these components increases, 
the other decreases, and vice versa. Despite the dismal performance of Portugal over the 
last decades, the available evidence seems to point to a reversal of the trajectory in the 
end of the last decade, both in efficiency and technological change components. It 
should noted furthermore that, although Portugal registers values below 1 in the 
technological change effect, that does not necessarily indicate technological regress, 
indicated instead a performance which is below other countries from the sample  
In order to check for the robustness of results, Figure 6 compares the findings obtained 
when using PWT and OECD data, for the overlapping period (1990-2010). The 
comparison is based on the use of the same combination of inputs (physical capital and 
labour), with total differences being calculated as the sum of the squared differences in 
the results obtained by each database for every single country considered. 
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Figure 5: Malmquist index components for Portugal 1991-2010 with different inputs combinations 
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Comparison of PWT and OECD results, 1990-2010 
From the different hypotheses that we experiment so far, it is only possible to make a 
direct comparison between the results of the analysis between 1990 and 2010 
considering physical capital and labour as inputs. The comparison of the results 
obtained using the two databases within this period is highlighted in Figure 6, which 
shows the countries that experienced greater variation. 
Figure 6: Differences between efficiency indexes calculated with PWT and OECD data
44
 
 
Although there are differences in the results for all countries, their magnitudes are very 
heterogeneous. While Austria, Ireland and UK show almost no differences, Greece, 
Sweden, and to a lesser extent Japan,
45
 present significant differences. Greece shows 
much more favourable results when the analysis is based on data from OECD, whereas 
the opposite occurs with regard to Sweden. Figure 7 shows in more detail these 
contradictory findings. It can be seen that differences are very significant when analysed 
in level, but not so much when trends are considered. In fact, in both cases the 
trajectories are relatively stable over the past two decades. 
 
                                               
44
 The differences relate to the period 1990-2010, considering physical capital and labour, and were 
calculated from the sum of the squared differences of the results of each database for each country. 
45
 In both cases, Japan records the worst performance of the sample, mostly due to its very high capital 
stock. We also tested the exclusion of Japan: the results remained similar for the other countries of the 
sample. 
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Figure 7: Differences between the results with PWT and OECD data 
 
Portugal shows also some discrepancies in the results using PWT and OECD data. 
Differences refer not only to magnitudes but also to the broad trajectories over the 
overlapping twenty years (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: Differences between the results with PWT and OECD data: Portugal 
 
Although the divergent trajectory in relation to the technological frontier is confirmed 
by the results with both databases, this trend is more pronounced when we use PWT 
data, particularly between 1992 and 2005. Thereafter, not only begins a process of 
convergence with the frontier, as the results with the two databases converge between 
them, at least until the last year of our analysis, where a new divergent trajectory seems 
to start.  
In order to find the causes underlying the different results, a comparison is made 
between the growth rates of the inputs considered. 
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Figure 9: Differences between the inputs growth rates in PWT and OECD data: Portugal 
 
Figure 9 shows the differences in the growth rates of physical capital and labour 
between the two databases. In the case of labour, although some time lags emerge, the 
data of PWT and OECD do not differ significantly. The trend is corroborated by the 
annual growth rate of total number of hours worked provided by The Conference Board 
Total Economy Database.
46
 With regards to physical capital, the discrepancies are more 
pronounced. The PWT indicator shows a more erratic behaviour when compared with 
OECD data.  
However, a staightforward analysis of these differences cannot be undertaken. If labour 
input measures used in the two stages are similar, that is, in both cases it was used the 
total number of hours worked (changing only the source of that data), in the case of 
physical capital the measures used are not directly comparable. For PWT we use the 
capital stock, while with OECD data,
 47
 we use the productive capital stock.  
Despite these differences, a common conclusion emerges from both results, namely, the 
deterioration of the Portuguese situation in the last decades, being this performance 
reflected in the diverget trajectory of Portugal to the EU15 average. 
It is also crucial to analyse if Portugal uses efficiently its available resources and to 
signal what resources are being used more inefficiently. For this purpose we explore 
another potentiality of the methodology used in our study. The DEA software allows 
not only to estimate the efficiency levels of each country, but also to estimate the 
optimum values of inputs (targets) for each level of  output (input oriented calculation), 
or the efficient output targets if we fix the inputs (output oriented analysis).  
                                               
46 Data were taken from The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, January 2013, 
http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/ 
47
 The tendency presented by the OECD data seems to have greater support in the results of other studies 
on Portuguese capital stocks, e.g., Silva 2010. 
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Starting with the input oriented analysis, we calculate the optimal values (target input 
values) of each input as a percentage of the quantity effectively used of each input. 
Figure 10 reports the results and the tendencies we have found.  
Values of 100% indicate that the input target coincides with the quantity of that input 
effectively used, i.e., means maximum efficiency. The lower this value, the greater the 
difference between the target and the amount actually used, i.e., higher inefficiency. 
Figure 10: Target input values as a percentage of values of inputs effectively used:Portugal 
 
The results show an overall decrease in efficiency from the beginning of the last decade, 
somewhat expected given the deviation from the technological frontier that occurred 
during this period. It is also possible to conclude that despite this divergent trend is 
generalized, labour emerges as the most inefficient factor. The relatively good 
performance of human capital and of R&D expenditures confirms their influence in the 
overall improvement of results when these inputs are included in the analysis. 
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In fact, the country made a strong investment in innovation and education in order to 
reduce the chronic deficits in these areas (e.g. Santiago et al. (2012) and IUS (2013)). 
Figure 11: Evolution of the average years of schooling of adult population in Portugal 
 
Figure 11 shows significant advances in the average level of education of the adult 
Portuguese population, of paramount importance for the performance of the country, as 
we have emphasized throughout this thesis. Not only recent studies such as those 
presented in previous sections, but also seminal works as Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
argue for the importance of human capital and its interaction with the distance from the 
technological frontier through the acceleration of technological diffusion via the 
increased capacity of absorption of spillovers.  
On the other hand, Figure 12 shows the evolution of two indicators linked to innovation 
and the technological change process. Both the indicator of Gross Expenditure on R&D 
(GERD) and the Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) show a clearly positive trend 
over the last few years. The BERD’s evolution is of particular importance. It shows that 
the increasing commitment with innovation comes not only from the public sector, but 
also from the private business sector. 
Figure 12: Evolution of technology and innovation indicators in Portugal 
 
Source: GERD and BERD were taken from OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/) and High-tech exports 
were taken from World Bank database (http://data.worldbank.org/) accessed on 20-07-2013. 
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This joint effort, public and private, has already given its fruits, both at the level of the 
profile of exports, and in the evolution of the technological balance (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Evolution of Portuguese technology balance of payments (thousands Euros) 
 
Source: Pordata/Banco de Portugal 
(http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Balanca+de+pagamentos+tecnologica+total+e+por+componentes-131, 
accessed on 26-08-2013.) 
Considering the changes in the profile of exports as indicative of alterations in national 
production as a whole, the indicator of technological intensity (high-technology exports 
as a percentage of manufactured exports) shows also signs of improvement over the last 
years.
48
 
Although these indicators give note of the investments made in the innovation area, in 
order to find out the extent of structural change that has been operating in Portugal we 
calculate two indices. One that measures the speed of structural change (MLI) and 
another that measures the dissimilarity of change in relation to a benchmark economy 
(IDIS). For their calculation, we use data from ISIC Rev. 3 version of STAN (Structural 
Analysis database) of OECD.
49
 
                                               
48
 However, these data should be carefully read. It is relevant to recall Silva and Teixeira (2011) that point 
to a shift of the Portuguese productive structure towards the non-tradable services sector. 
   On the other hand, Aiginger and Falk (2005) show that Portugal is one of the OECD countries where 
changes in export share of high-technology industries generate higher GDP growth bonus. 
49 See more details about this calculation in Annex. 
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The Modified Lilien Index (MLI)
50
 measures the variations between the shares of 
different sectors in a certain period of time, considering the weight of each sector in 
both initial and final time. Therefore, the MLI seems a good option for measuring the 
speed of structural change. 
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Where x is the share of i sectors between t and s, where t = 2, ..., T, and s = 1, ..., T-1.  
We calculate the MLI on both volumes (value added) at constant prices, and in terms of 
employment. Table 12 shows the results. 
Table 12: Structural change Index (MLI) 1986-2006
51
 
Country 
Measure 
considered 
MLI average 
1986-2006 
Portugal 
Sample mean 
Value added 
1,132735996 
1,049822239 
Portugal 
Sample mean 
Employment 
1,115153962 
0,818848152 
In the two decades between 1986 and 2006 Portugal recorded levels of change in its 
production structure above the average recorded by the countries in our sample. 
However, as several empirical studies presented in previous sections highlight (e.g. 
Laursen, 2000), it is rather important the similarity of productive structures as enhancer 
of convergence since facilitates the diffusion and absortion of knowledge and 
technology coming from the countries on the technological frontier. Thus, we compute 
not only an index that measures the speed of structural change, but also its direction. 
The Index of Dissimilitary of Industrial Structures (IDIS)
52
 allows to assess the 
direction that change is following, measuring the dissimilarity between the structures of 
a given country r (Portugal) and a benchmark country b. 
                                               
50
 This index was constructed in the 1980s by Lilien (1982) to measure the structural change in the 
demand for employment. However, since that time the index has been refined and used in several studies 
on structural change (e.g. Dietrich, 2012). 
51
 The choice of 2006 as final year of the analysis was a restriction imposed by the inexistence of data 
after that date. 
52
 This index was already used by Kallioras and Petrakos (2010) in their analysis of the structural changes 
in the countries of the former Eastern bloc after their integration into the EU. 
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We calculate the IDIS in relation to three countries: Ireland, Germany and the UK. The 
first one was chosen because it was the cohesion country with better performance 
during the last two decades. Germany was selected for being the biggest European 
economy and often considered as the engine of the EU. Finally, the United Kingdom is 
our benchmark over the calculations of the technological frontier, and has been on the 
frontier throughout the entire period in analysis.  
Figure 14 shows the evolution of this last index both when calculated based on the value 
added of each sector, and when calculated in relation to the sectoral share of 
employment. The higher the value of the index, the greater is the difference between the 
productive structure of the country under analysis and the benchmark country.  
Figure 14: Evolution of IDIS in Portugal vs. Ireland, Germany and United Kingdom 
 
The results show a curious relation. The country that has higher similarity with Portugal 
as regards the value added of each sector (UK) is the one that has higher dissimilarity 
when the index is calculated based on the share of employment. In turn, Ireland that 
presents greater dissimilarity in the structure of value added is the country with a 
distribution of employment by sectors more similar to the presented by Portugal. 
It is also clearly visible that the results do not show a trend of approximation of the 
Portuguese productive structure with those presented by these three countries, all with 
better performances than Portugal. 
In sum, there are change signs in Portugal in recent years. The education level of the 
population has increased, the investment in R&D has also progressively increased, 
especially in the last few years, and structural change indices point to significative 
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changes in the productive structure of the country. However, these results should be 
analysed in combination with the results previously obtained in our empirical study, i.e., 
if, on one hand, there is evidence of structural and technological change over the last 
years in Portugal, on the other hand, these results have not been enough by themselves 
to put the country closer to the technological frontier and achieve a successful catching-
up process (see Figure 15). 
Figure 15: Evolution of GDP per head of Portugal (EU15 =100) 
  
Source: GDP per head, US $, constant prices, constant PPPs, reference year 2005 taken from OECD 
database (http://stats.oecd.org/) accessed on 27-06-2013. 
This inability to converge to the EU15 average leads us to our other question: Does 
Portugal use efficiently its available resources? 
Using now the results from the output oriented estimation of the technological frontier, 
we get the optimal values (target values) of GDP, given the values of each input per 
year. 
Figure 16: Evolution of the effective Portuguese GDP vs. efficient target 
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Figure 16 clearly shows that an efficient use of available resources would allow 
achieving a higher GDP. The difference between the effective product and the 
“potential” one is highly accentuated since the turn of the century. In fact, these 
evidences seem to confirm a problem of inefficient use of the available resources. 
Taking these values of the efficient GDP and calculating the efficient GDP per capita 
(gdp_pc_pt*/EU15) between 1990 and 2010, we can make an extrapolation of what 
would be the trajectory of convergence of Portugal over the last 20 years if the 
considered inputs (physical capital, labour, human capital and GERD) were efficiently 
used.
53
 
Figure 17: Evolution of the effective Portuguese GDP vs. efficient target (EU15=100) 
 
This exercise shows that if Portugal were more efficient in the use of resources, it could 
converge to the EU15 average in the last decade, instead of registering an effective 
divergence. 
This is one of the main conclusions of the empirical exercise presented throughout this 
chapter. Despite the progress achieved by the country and the good economic growth 
rates recorded, particularly after the entry into the EEC which was reflected in a period 
of convergence with the European average, our study reveals that over the last few 
decades the level of efficiency of the country sharply fell. When we include in the 
analysis factors such as human capital and spending on R&D the results improve, but 
not enough to change the divergent trajectory to the technological frontier. 
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 In this analysis we consider the efficient use of inputs by Portugal, but we maintain unchanged the 
results effectively recorded by the other countries. 
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Chapter 4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
“The Portuguese economy is in serious trouble: Productivity growth is anemic. Growth 
is very low. The budget deficit is large. The current account deficit is very large.” 
        (Blanchard, 2007, p. 1) 
The Blanchard’s warning in 2007 is even more worrying today. The Portuguese 
economy is in recession since 2010 and consistent signs of recovery are not yet evident. 
However, despite this gloomy scenario, Portugal has made a great progress over the 
previous decades. Especially after the entry in EEC in 1986, the indicators of health, 
education and welfare reached levels well above those recorded in previous decades 
(Mateus, 2013), being the country considered a success case within the EU. It was also 
in this period that convergence with EU15 partners was intensified. However, this 
convergent trajectory became very slow, and since the turn of the century Portugal has 
been diverging from the European average. 
There are several factors that may help to understand this change. The adoption of the 
Euro and consequent loss of monetary sovereignty, the EU enlargement to the Eastern 
European countries and the entrance of countries such China in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are some of them (cf. Blanchard, 2007). 
In this thesis we focus on a complementary set of explaining factors related to the 
country’s evolution regarding structure, technology and innovation. Technological 
change has been a major source of differences in growth patterns since at least the 
Industrial Revolution. Although neoclassical tradition predicts convergence as a natural 
consequence of growth processes, the empirical evidence shows a different situation 
where some countries catch-up, while others fall behind, which seems to be in close 
agreement with neo-Schumpeterian views on the matter. 
According to the technology gap literature, innovation contributes to divergence in per 
capita income levels between countries, whereas diffusion leads to the opposite trend. 
The role of imitation has, however, become significantly weaker in more recent times, 
whereas innovation increased its importance both in economic growth and convergence, 
being catching-up processes nowadays technologically more demanding than in the 
past. Even innovation appears as necessary but not sufficient in convergence processes, 
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which, as deeply analysed throughout this thesis, do not take place automatically, 
requiring a number of economic and social conditions to be met (e.g. Fagerberg and 
Verspagen (2002), Abramovitz (1994)). In this respect, the country’s openness to trade 
and education (human capital) seem to constitute important factors in the adoption and 
development of innovation, although in some cases the country’s specialization may 
limit its  growth potential (Amable, 2000). 
In its turn, human capital plays a crucial role in this chess. Human capital not only has a 
direct effect on growth (as a production factor) but also an indirect effect by enabling 
imitation and technological catching up. The Portuguese educational deficit seems, 
indeed, to constitute one of the major problems of the country, as acknowledged by a 
variety of studies. 
Human capital also affects the speed and direction of structural change. To the extent 
that education backwardness makes difficult the development of more knowledge-
intensive sectors and the adoption of new technologies, and since these sectors generally 
induce an added bonus in economic growth, the relatively low human capital levels 
strongly determine the economic (under)performance of the country. 
Since the vast majority of studies focusing on “real economy” features of the 
Portuguese case are based on descriptive statistics or econometric analysis, we decided 
to use an alternative approach, based on the estimation of technological frontiers. 
Although some studies included Portugal in the estimation of a technology frontier, no 
explicit analysis was done regarding to the Portuguese case. Moreover the evidence 
found by these different studies regarding Portugal was in many cases contradictory. 
In order to clarify these discrepancies, and contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
Portuguese growth path up to the present, we used the DEA method to estimate the 
technological frontier and measure the distance of each country relative to the frontier. 
With a sample comprising 19 OECD countries, we divided our empirical analysis in 
two stages. In the first one, we used PWT data, considering two inputs (physical capital 
and labour) and GDP as the output, in order to estimate the efficiency indexes from 
1970 to 2010. The results showed the deterioration of the Portuguese situation during 
this period. Since 1980 Portugal began a divergent path from the technological frontier, 
with this decline being accentuated in the 1990s. The Mamquist index that measures 
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TPF also presented values bellow the unity, meaning that Portuguese TFP suffered 
deterioration during these decades. 
In the second step of our empirical work, we used OECD data, adding two new inputs 
(R&D and human capital) to the analysis. This procedure allowed us to get a more 
appropriate description of the production possibilities frontier and test for the robustness 
of the previously estimated results. In this stage, we focused our analysis between 1990 
and 2010.  
When the four inputs were considered, the results showed an overall improvement, 
blurring the differences between countries. In fact, Portugal was one of the countries 
that benefited more with the introduction of new inputs. The results indicated that in the 
first half of the 1990s there was an approximation to the frontier, however, the trend 
was reversed afterwards and the country diverged until almost the end of first decade of 
the XXI century. The trajectory does not suffer major changes when different input 
combinations are considered, being the alterations essentially in levels, rather then 
trends. 
The TFP measured by the Malmquist index showed both values below unity, denoting a 
deterioration of Portuguese TFP, and values below the sample mean, showing a 
relatively worse performance than the other analysed countries. 
Such trend was already observed in the first stage of our study. In fact, the comparison 
between the results of the first and second steps of our analysis did not reveal significant 
differences, which gives robustness to the conclusions. Once again, the differences are 
essentially in “level”, with the trajectory always diverging from the frontier since the 
mid-1990s. 
In order to understand which factors most contributed to this poor performance, we 
compared the input values effectively used with the optimum values (targets) for each 
level of output, using an input oriented approach. The greater this difference, the greater 
the inefficiency of the country. From this analysis we concluded that labour was the 
factor that most penalized the country’s efficiency results. In contrast, human capital 
and R&D expenditure were the factors with better efficiency level and thus more 
contributive for the improvement of Portuguese results. 
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Finally, we performed an output oriented exercise to estimate what would be the 
Portuguese GDP if the available inputs were spent efficiently. The results show that the 
country would have been able to keep converging to European partners in the last 
decade. In fact, if this has been the case, the country would be positioned almost 15 
percentage points above the record actually achieved in 2010. 
In short, despite the economic growth recorded in the second half of the twentieth 
century, our study showed that the country began to diverge from the technological 
frontier, even during this period. The main causes for this situation are structural deficits 
in several domains, with emphasis on education and innovation, and the inability to 
efficiently use the available resources. Despite the investments and the evolution 
recorded in recent years in these fields, Portugal still presents a negative gap compared 
to its competitors, and the efficiency levels show a negative trend since, at least, the 
beginning of 1990s until almost the end of the first decade of the XXI century.  
We detected however some signs that may indicate an inversion of the divergent trend. 
In order to achieve such possibility, we argue that some policy measures could 
contribute to a better use of resources, particularly the investments in education and 
R&D, towards a more effective structural and technological change. Varblane et al. 
(2007) suggest a series of measures for catching-up countries to strengthen their 
innovation systems and thus build more sustainable and knowledge-based economies. A 
first proposed condition, and probably the most important, is the need for a strategic 
vision of medium-long term that articulates policies in various domains rather than a 
short-term vision that seeks only fast results but probably of small extent. In this field, 
the case of the so-called “Asian tigers” is paradigmatic of how a coherent strategic 
vision allows creating more competitive economies.
54
  
In Portugal, the diagnosis is to some extent consensual: the change of our development 
model passes critically through a systematic bet on innovation and a persistent process 
of qualification of human resources (Tavares, 2007). If we consider the improvements 
in education and innovation the country has recently registered, there is the possibility 
that such investments, jointly with efficiency improvement, may result in the 
resumption of a trajectory convergence. 
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 Fagerberg and Godinho (2004) provide a short, but complete, picture of these cases. 
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Along with these reforms, there must be policies in order to create conditions to the 
productive structure to absorb the new qualified manpower, thus minimizing the 
phenomena of “brain drain”.55 In a period in which domestic investment is scarce, a 
good use of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) promoting the integration of national firms 
in networks and partnerships could be not only a good opportunity to Portuguese 
companies to acquire new technologies, but also an opportunity to create jobs for new 
graduates and post graduates that the country has formed. The new European 
Community Support Framework 2014-2020 can also play an important role in 
promoting the changes towards a more competitive economy. On the other hand, 
Portugal has great potential in activities as tourism and some agriculture. Thus, it seems 
mandatory to find a balance by not restricting policy intervention to investments in 
R&D and activities linked to the leading edge sectors, but also to reinforce the 
competitiveness of some traditional sectors.  
With this thesis, we expect to have contributed for some crucial problems that the 
country has been facing. Conversely, this is a work in progress. Taking into account our 
results, it would be interesting to calculate TFP for the same period using other 
techniques, e.g., growth accounting, in order to compare the trends. Also taking into 
account the efficiency results for the four inputs considered in the empirical analysis, it 
would be useful to implement an econometric test to measure the weight and 
consequent impact of each input in Portuguese economic growth. Thus, it would be 
possible to define further a better policy strategy to overcome the present situation. 
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 Docquier and Rapoport (2012) identified Portugal as one of the countries that most suffers with this 
process. 
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Annex 
For the calculation of MLI and IDIS we use data from ISIC Rev. 3 version of STAN 
(Structural Analysis database) of OECD. Due to the unavailability of ISIC Rev.3 data in 
its maximum disaggregation, we use aggregate data in the nine main “clusters”.56 
Table 13: Subsectors considered in the Structural Change indexes 
Description ISIC Rev. 3 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 01-05 
Mining and quarrying 10-14 
Manufacturing 15-37 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 
Construction 45 
Wholesale and retail trade-restaurants and hotels 50-55 
Transport, storage and communications 60-64 
Finance, insurance, real state and business services 65-74 
Community, social and personal services 75-99 
The index was calculated based on data expressed in volume (value added) at constant 
prices
57
 and in terms of employment.
58
 
 
                                               
56
 The complete STAN industry list where the formation of each of these clusters can be found is 
available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/40729523.pdf, accessed on 27-07-2013. 
57
 Except Ireland that, due to the non existence of constant price data, the calculations were based on 
values in volume at current prices. Yet, as all values are relativized by the total value added, seems that 
this fact not distorts the analysis. 
58
 In this case, we exclude Greece of the sample due to the inexistence of available data. 
